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I. INTRODUCTION
This article completes a two-part series studying the constitu-
tional jurisprudence of Judges Antonin Scalia, Richard Posner, Rob-
ert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, and Ralph Winter Jr., five conservative
academics appointed by President Reagan to the United States Court
of Appeals. Judge Scalia has recently been appointed to the Supreme
Court of the United States.I In a previous article, published in the
last issue of the University of Miami Law Review, I evaluated these five
jurists' constitutional scholarship by contrasting their views with
those of Edmund Burke, the originator of political conservative the-
ory.' That article tested Burke's wariness of political abstractions and
his hatred of tyranny against those five jurists' theoretical works, and
concluded that, of the five men's philosophies, Posner's commitment
to wealth maximization and Bork's positivism were the most danger-
ous forms of constitutional jurisprudence.3 Easterbrook's commit-
ment to law and economics was not as relentless. Neither Winter nor
Scalia has ever presented a grand theory of constitutional law.
To dramatize the gulf between Burke and these men, I first sum-
marized Burke's views and then applied Burke's arguments to issues
studied by each of the five scholar judges. Judge Bork concluded that,
as a jurist, he only had a moral obligation to enforce the majority's
will as reflected in existing law. I argued that such positivism differed
from Burke's theory of a mixed government, which was in part pre-
mised upon fear of the majority.4 Posner's economic theories led him
to justify slavery as economically efficient. Distrustful of economics,
Burke would have castigated both Posner's methodology and conclu-
sion; for Burke, slavery was the paradigm of tyranny.5 Easterbrook's
rejection of applying justice in adjudication clashed with Burke's
observation that all political questions are moral questions.6 Scalia's
1. The Senate confirmed Judge Scalia's appointment in September 1986.
2. See Wilson, Justice Diffused: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the
Views of Five Conservative, Academic Judges, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 913 (1986).
3. Id. at 973-75.
4. Id. at 946-49.
5. Id. at 957.
6. Id. at 960.
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attack on affirmative action-ranking the theoretical right that deci-
sion-makers totally ignore race above the historical plight of the
blacks-ranked theory above history and context.7 Winter's attack
on wealth redistribution was also abstract.' And above all, the five
scholar judges' general complaint that the Supreme Court has acted
"illegitimately"-a complaint that contains the implication that ille-
gitimate decisions can and should be overruled-placed their theo-
rizing above the Supreme Court's history. They were not being
sufficiently deferential to institutions, values, and traditions which
they, like the rest of us, cannot completely understand or accept.
This article's primary goal is to analyze these judges' major con-
stitutional opinions so that the reader can make his or her own con-
clusions, which may range from ecstasy to the sensation that one is
walking in the land of the dead. The reader should be aware that my
frequent criticisms are not only directed at these jurists' decisions. I
also am concerned about the types of arguments the judges have used
to justify their holdings. Evaluating modes of argument might seem
esoteric to someone unfamiliar with contemporary constitutional
jurisprudence. That person should know that these judges have been
major participants in the modern debate over the alleged "illegiti-
macy" of certain forms of constitutional rhetoric and of certain con-
stitutional opinions-notably Roe v. Wade,9 the abortion rights case.
Although these jurists may argue in one case that certain types of
arguments should not be used, each relies on those same forms in
subsequent opinions. That rhetorical inconsistency may be the great-
est normative indictment of their conception of "constitutional legiti-
macy." If they are willing to employ "changed circumstances" or
"substantive due process" to justify some of their holdings, then they
cannot excommunicate liberals for "illegitimately" applying the same
kinds of arguments in decisions with which they disagree.
The following opinions raise, of course, many other important
questions. How "conservative" have these judges been? To put the
matter bluntly, President Reagan must be pleased with these men,
who, to varying degrees, have made major creative contributions to
emerging right-wing jurisprudence. They have aggressively applied
traditional conservative judicial techniques: increasing judicial defer-
ence to other branches of government and imposing new limits on
federal court jurisdiction. Some of them have also discussed such
abstract, academic concepts as legitimacy, negative liberties, margin-
7. Id. at 965-69.
8. Id. at 969-73.
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ality, and majoritarianism. For better or worse, the average constitu-
tional lawyer must become more familiar with the current academic
debate over how to interpret the Constitution, particularly now that
Judge Scalia has received the ultimate reward.
Nevertheless, a review of a block of their opinions generates two
surprising conclusions, at least to this writer. First, some of the opin-
ions are acceptable by most contemporary "liberal" standards. A few
are even generous interpretations of constitutional rights. Second, the
Burkean fear of excessive constitutional theorizing has not proven to
be a reliable test of which judge would be the least sympathetic to
plaintiffs who allege constitutional violations. Despite or perhaps
because of their abstractions, Judges Bork and Posner wrote several
opinions with which most modern liberals would agree.' 0 Judge Eas-
terbrook once again resists easy categorization. Modern liberals will
agree with many of Judge Winter's criminal law opinions. I Judge
Scalia, whose academic writings have not been very theoretical, has
been the least hospitable to constitutional complaints.
Burke probably would have been amused to see that the applica-
tion of his anti-theory to other theorists' jurisprudence failed to
explain their subsequent behavior. After all, abstract theory can
enhance as well as threaten constitutional rights. These two articles
thus demonstrate the elusive relationship of constitutional theory to
constitutional doctrine. Nobody can perfectly predict how a person
will decide cases after reaching the bench. Even the most fanatical
scholar, proudly committed to an elegantly consistent jurisprudence,
will probably feel the pressures of litigants, colleagues, and precedent
once he or she dons a robe. For a variety of reasons, only a few of
which might ever be articulated, that scholar may reluctantly leave in
the study some personal constitutional beliefs, such as everyone
should get an equal share of the nation's assets, or children should
starve if their parents cannot compete successfully in the market-
place. 2 The scholar is no longer solely a follower of Marx or of
Nozick, but is now also an American judge who must interpret the
Constitution. Now that he or she actually has power, the academic
judge should reconsider how general political theory determines judi-
cial interpretation, which in turn might prevent or limit the constitu-
tionalization of that judge's previously held substantive political
beliefs.
10. See infra notes 67-72, 191-98, 282-87 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
12. Professor Dworkin recently argued that even his ideal judge, Hercules, would not
judicially impose his conception of justice without considering fairness, integrity, and existing
community values. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 249 (1986).
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At times, scholars such as Bork and Posner, who have created
elaborate constitutional structures, may need to deviate more from
their theoretical writings than such relatively pragmatic academics as
Judge Scalia. Furthermore, all these conservative judges may be less
willing to impose their own substantive political ideologies because
they had previously criticized many Supreme Court Justices for
improperly constitutionalizing personal political preferences. Finally,
it is one thing to write about these problems; it is another to be imme-
diately responsible to both the litigants and society.
As jurists, these men have been very conscious of their limited
power. Some of them have frequently written dicta suggesting how
they would decide a case if they were on the Supreme Court or if the
case was one of first impression. The rule of law may have limited
influence on Supreme Court Justices, but it clearly exists in the lower
courts. 13
Because these judges' power is so much less than that of the Jus-
tices, we have completed an ironic circle. We should evaluate these
judges as nominees for the Supreme Court by refocusing on the
Burkean fear of ideology as well as their opinions. A Supreme Court
Justice has far more discretion to implement his or her theory of law
than a judge on the court of appeals. Consequently, liberals may find
Judge Scalia, who did not write very abstractly, more acceptable than
Judges Bork and Posner, even though Scalia has written the most dis-
turbing judicial opinions.
How can liberals account for their agreement with many of these
judges' decisions? Karl Llewellyn concluded from his study of
thousands of appellate cases that the immense judicial discretion to
define rights and obligations in the "leeways" of precedent is stabi-
lized by fifteen factors, the most important of which is the "American
appellate judicial tradition."' 4  The other factors, expressed in
Llewellyn's inimitable prose, range from the Hegelian-"The General
Period-Style and Its Promise"-to the prosaically procedural-"A
Frozen Record from Below."'" This article will not be able to explain
why these judges sometimes altered their views. But it will attempt to
demonstrate that such shifts continue to occur in the ways Llewellyn
described, even among extremely able, thoughtful men who have pre-
viously pondered questions similar to those they now must resolve as
jurists.
Perhaps this slight moderating, centralizing shift is encapsulized
13. Id. at 47.
14. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19 (1960).
15. Id.
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in the phrase "the rule of law." That phrase, of course, has a complex
intellectual history.16 We can avoid becoming entangled in that major
jurisprudential debate by once again turning to Llewellyn, who
described the appellate process as the rule of law and men, instead of
the rule of laws and not men: "[T]he formula 'of laws and not' is
inherently false, the formula 'by the Law,' rightly understood, can,
when provided with the right rules, right techniques, and right
officers, come close to being accurate."' 17 Thus, aside from any con-
temporary value this article has in analyzing conservative jurispru-
dence and in studying current and possible future Supreme Court
Justices, it is also an empirical inquiry into the impact "the rule of
law" may have on the United States Court of Appeals.
These particular five judges provide very good test cases of how
judicial power does and does not temper prior beliefs, because the five
men spent many years prior to their appointments exploring constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Unlike most lawyers, who primarily articulate
their client's position, these scholars have frequently and forcefully
presented their own views on constitutional law.
The main point of this article is not to prove that the "rule of
law" exists. I made that proposition in part to provoke some of my
liberal academic colleagues to recognize that some of these scholars'
decisions are acceptable. Some of those liberals may reply that the
following cases actually prove that no changes occurred in these
judges' jurisprudence from the time they were academics; or that any
changes were for other reasons; or that the changes were for the
worse. Critical legal scholars may observe that any convergence dem-
onstrates that the gap between existing liberal and conservative theory
is a small one.
There is a final reason to study these opinions. Although the five
judges tend to think about the law in the same way, they do not pres-
ent a monolithic front. They sometimes disagree over major constitu-
tional issues. These disputes may reflect the split within the right
between traditionalism and libertarianism. Judges Bork, Scalia, and
Easterbrook are more deferential to the state and to history than
Judges Posner and Winter, who are strongly attracted to the liberta-
rian values of the marketplace. Before he became a judge,
16. For instance, Ronald Dworkin has recently made the following definition of the "rule
of law" a central premise of his jurisprudence: "Law insists that force not be used or withheld,
no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or noble these
ends, except as licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past
political decisions about when collective force is justified." R. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 93.
17. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 14, at 12 n.l.
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Easterbrook, however, was also a strong advocate of the use of eco-
nomics in law. Thus, as a judge, he became somewhat more positivist.
This article shall discuss almost all of these judges' access, first
amendment, equal protection, governmental structure, and due pro-
cess cases. This large group of cases may at times exhaust the reader.
But as Llewellyn showed years ago, one can learn much by studying a
large block of cases, not just the few most controversial ones. With a
few exceptions, this article will not address the constitutional criminal
law cases. Incidentally, criminal defendants have frequently lost their
cases in front of these five jurists: criminal defendants and/or prison-
ers won only 11 out of 50 cases. '8 The article shall separately present
each judge's opinions. This author stopped using LEXIS and
WESTLAW to make general surveys of the judges' opinions as of
May 28, 1986, although the article includes a few important cases
decided after that date.
II. A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW
One crude way to gain an initial perspective on a judge's consti-
tutional viewpoint is to determine how often that judge has written
constitutional opinions favoring criminal defendants, media defend-
ants, and civil plaintiffs.' 9 Judges who are sympathetic to these three
groups are usually considered "liberal." Even under that admittedly
clumsy test, the five judges being studied do not present a consistent
front. Because I am primarily interested in what each judge has actu-
ally written, I have not included in my survey a complete review of all
the other opinions that each of the judges joined. Such an omission
has its costs. For example, Judge Scalia joined in an opinion affirming
a jury verdict in which the jury decided that the Washington Post
libeled the head of Mobil Oil.20 He also agreed with Judge Bork's
decision validating the Navy discharge of a serviceman for being
18. See infra notes 24, 28-29, 32, 34-35 and accompanying text.
19. I have not included in this survey taxpayer protest suits or cases involving litigation
fanatics who file multiple lawsuits, because most of those actions are out of the mainstream.
For example, few of us would disagree with Judge Scalia's assessing double costs and
attorney's fees after a protester appealed a case in which he or his attorney failed to appear at a
hearing to resolve claims he had previously lost. Mathes v. C.I.R., 788 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1986). Such judicial penalties seem reasonable responses to such claims as "30th Issue-IRS
Makes War On Citizens." Id. at 35.
Judge Winter ruled against a tax protester in United States v. Carley, 783 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2115 (1986), and a plaintiff who had sued over 250 times in In re
Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 191 (1984).
20. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir.
1985). Judge Scalia joined in the opinion that Judge McKinnon wrote.
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homosexual.2" On the other hand, Scalia joined Judge Bork's decision
upholding the right of an artist to display a poster that falsely repre-
sented President Reagan making fun of poor people.22
Judge Scalia wrote twenty-three opinions that affected those
three groups. He ruled against them in twenty cases, and in one case
split his decision, primarily at the expense of the media defendant in a
libel suit. 3 Civil plaintiffs suing the government lost sixteen out of
seventeen cases raising constitutional issues. Prosecutors won three
out of four cases.24 Libel plaintiffs won one case,2 5 and partially pre-
vailed in another.26
Judge Bork wrote opinions in twenty-three cases involving signif-
icant constitutional issues. Civil plaintiffs contesting governmental
action won six out of twenty-one cases. Judge Bork favored the gov-
ernment in ten out of eleven cases in which he discussed access
issues.2 7  One criminal defendant 2 and one prisoner 29 each lost his
claim. The only libel plaintiff lost his case. 30  Bork wrote opinions
favoring first amendment plaintiffs in three out of five cases, although
he joined Scalia in four decisions unreceptive to first amendment
claims.31
Already renowned throughout the legal academy as a prolific
writer, Judge Posner has enhanced that reputation by producing an
21. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court of the
United States recently upheld state sodomy laws. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 284 (1986).
22. Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
23. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. Judge Scalia decided four constitutional cases involving criminal defendants or
prisoners. He ruled against the defendants in three of those cases. United States v. Byers, 740
F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir.) (fifth and sixth amendments), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046 (1984); Chaney
v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (eighth amendment); United States v. Richardson,
702 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (double jeopardy), rev'd, 468 U.S. 317 (1984). He upheld a
defendant's claim of lack of diversity jurisdiction in Tavoulareas v. Comnas, 720 F.2d 192
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
25. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
26. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see infra notes 76-82
and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 170-86 and accompanying text.
28. In the only criminal case he has decided, Judge Bork ruled against the criminal
defendant in United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (fourth amendment). In
the course of that opinion, he severely criticized the "shock the conscience" test. Id. at 1323.
29. Although it also involves the criminal justice system, I have included Cosgrove v.
Smith in the text because it raises equal protection issues. 697 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
30. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
31. Since this article went to press, Judge Bork has written an opinion narrowing the first
amendment. He held that the District of Columbia could prevent demonstrators "critical" of
foreign governments from demonstrating within five hundred feet of those governments'
embassies. Bork held that the law properly balanced the first amendment against the United
States' interest in protecting embassy officials. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
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extraordinary number of judicial opinions. In twelve constitutional
cases raising significant access issues, he has favored the plaintiff nine
times and neither party twice. Plaintiffs alleging first amendment vio-
lations won four out of eleven cases, with one split decision. He
granted partial relief to a plaintiff in a "false light" suit against Hus-
tler magazine, where the defendant had claimed first amendment pro-
tection. He fully supported only two out of ten plaintiffs raising equal
protection arguments, and provided partial relief in two other cases.
He has explored and partially redefined procedural due process in
twenty-four opinions, seventeen of which favored the government.
He discussed substantive due process in four decisions. Twenty-three
out of twenty-seven criminal defendants or prisoners did not convince
him that their constitutional claims should prevail.32
32. Judge Posner has ruled against most criminal defendants and inmates, frequently by
finding that any alleged error was "harmless." McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.
1985) (parole violations); United States v. Cerro, 775 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1985) (harmless
error); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1985) (fifth amendment); United States
v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985) (seventh amendment, witness production); Prater v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 764 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting) (ex post facto
laws), vacated, 775 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1985); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985)
(decree to improve jail conditions); United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1985) (ex
post facto), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.
1984) (fourth amendment), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1853 (1985); United States v. Silverstein,
732 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1984) (fifth amendment, defense counsel error); McKinney v. George,
726 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1984) (fourth amendment); Nichols v. Gagnon, 710 F.2d 1267 (7th
Cir. 1983) (jury instructions on lesser included offense), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 940 (1984);
United States v. Tranowski, 702 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1983) (double jeopardy), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 3586 (1986); Carbajol v. Fairman, 700 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1983) (evidence); Merritt v.
Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(eighth amendment, right to counsel), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983); United States v.
Bounos, 693 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1982) (double jeopardy); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting) (appointment of counsel in civil suit filed by inmate);
Sulie v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (right to counsel), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1043 (1983); United States ex rel. Stevens v. Circuit Court, 675 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1982)
(double jeopardy); Davis v. Franzen, 671 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1982) (habeas corpus, sixth
amendment).
He did allow a district judge to question allegedly excessive fees in a criminal case.
United States v. Vague, 697 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983). Posner reversed a conviction because
the trial judge harassed the defendant's lawyer, stating: "It is enough that Judge Seraphim by
his threats to [defendant's counsel] appreciably reduced the likelihood that [counsel] would
conduct a vigorous defense." Walsberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1073 (7th Cir. 1985). He also
favored a civil rights action in Llaguno v. Mingey by reversing a jury verdict in favor of the
police. 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985). He noted the need for civil suits to deter
unconstitutional police behavior, particularly with the narrowing of the exclusionary rule. Id.
at 1570. On the other hand, he dismissed a section 1983 action that challenged two arrests
based upon warrants containing racial discrepancies. See Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39 (7th
Cir. 1982).
The judge discussed the "changed circumstances" argument in the course of upholding a
prisoner's habeas corpus petition based upon possible perjury:
Townsend was a product of its time. The southern states' resistance to court-
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Judge Easterbrook has been far less responsive than Judge
Posner to plaintiffs bringing constitutional claims. He agreed with
states' access defenses in three out of four cases. Plaintiffs seeking
additional procedural protection under the due process clause lost
three out of four times. His only discussion of substantive due process
was filled with antipathy.33 Plaintiffs prevailed on two out of four first
amendment cases. All seven criminal defendants lost their claims.34
Unlike his colleagues, Judge Winter has frequently favored crim-
inal defendants and prisoners; he provided them with at least partial
relief in six out of ten cases. 35 Winter, however, has not been so "lib-
ordered desegregation had induced a widespread skepticism concerning the
willingness of government in those states, including the courts, to protect the
federal constitutional rights of their black citizens ....
It is thus doubtful that the standard laid down in Townsend for deciding
when an evidentiary hearing is mandatory would be adopted by the Supreme
Court today.
United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261, 268 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)).
33. Gumz v. Morrisette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644
(1986).
34. United States ex rel. Miller v. Greer, 789 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (fifth amendment);
United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (prosecutorial commentary, double
jeopardy); United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1985) (jury proceedings); United
States v. Kimberlin, 776 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1985) (sentencing); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772
F.2d 1410 (7th Cir. 1985) (fifth amendment), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 541 (1986); Gumz v.
Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985) (due process), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644 (1986);
United States ex rel. Jones v. Derobertis, 766 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1985) (due process), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1280 (1986).
35. Winter's decisions in favor of criminal defendants or incarcerated individuals were
often dissents and/or concurrences. Judge Winter upheld an extortion conviction, but
protested charging politicians with mail fraud: "The majority opinion vests federal
prosecutors with largely unchecked power to harass political opponents. It may be that we
should expect only 'enlightened statesmen' to hold such office, but, with Madison, I would
prefer not to take such a risk." United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 143 n.5 (2d Cir.
1982) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He held that courts should not
"permit the systematic interrogation of witnesses on direct examination by counsel who knows
they will assert the privilege against self-incrimination." Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717
F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter held that the federal
government did not meet its burden of proof in a wire fraud case, and that its theory of wire
fraud was unconstitutional: "[C]onstitutional protection against double jeopardy becomes
relatively meaningless since successive prosecutions need only allege different calls." United
States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). He also wanted to remand a case because he found grounds to show that
the defendant's counsel had been inadequate. United States ex rel. Roche v. Scully, 739 F.2d
739, 745 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also held
that a prisoner who had been denied temporary release time had a claim deserving additional
discovery because the prisoner had behaved well for years. Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10
(2d Cir. 1983). Finally, he declared a statute that gave the state broad power to detain
juveniles unconstitutional: "We hold only that pre-trial detention may not be imposed for
anti-crime purposes pursuant to a substantively and procedurally unlimited authority when, in
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eral" in civil cases. He ruled against the plaintiff in the only case
raising important access issues. All three plaintiffs alleging proce-
dural due process violations lost. In the only case raising first amend-
ment issues, he denied the media additional access to courts. Both of
his important equal protection cases were "conservative;" he was hos-
tile to affirmative action and to blacks who challenged quotas
designed to limit "white flight." He favored the state in one out of
two cases involving states' powers.
III. SCALIA
A. Access to Courts
Judge Scalia has been particularly adept at invoking procedural
defenses to constitutional claims. As noted above, he ruled against
sixteen out of seventeen civil plaintiffs who claimed their constitu-
tional rights had been violated. He decided twelve of those cases on
procedural grounds, ruling primarily in favor of the plaintiff only
once.36 Thus, Scalia's relentless conservatism is not readily apparent;
we do not know how he would decide many problems because he
often does not reach the merits.
In a law review article published after his appointment, Judge
Scalia argued that the doctrine of standing had substantive content.37
In other words, the Court should include such values as federalism in
deciding if a plaintiff has a "case or controversy" under article III of
the Constitution. Scalia cited Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Valley
Forge:38 "The dictum of Flast has been disavowed by opinions that
all likelihood, most detainees will either not be adjudicated guilty or will not be sentenced to
confinement after an adjudication of guilt." Martin v. Stasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 374 (2d Cir.
1982). Justice Rehnquist subsequently wrote an opinion upholding a New York preventive
detention statute for juveniles. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), rev'g Martin v. Stasburg,
689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982).
Judge Winter ruled completely in favor of the state in four cases: United States v. Reed,
773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985) (venue); Cousart v. Hammock, 745 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1984)
(waiver); Vasquez v. Scully, 730 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1984) (exhaustion under habeas corpus);
Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1982) (prison lock-up during guard funeral).
36. He found standing for most of the plaintiffs' claims in Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986). Because the opinion holding the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutional was an unsigned per curiam decision, I have not
included any of its refutations of procedural defenses in this section, even though Scalia may
have written most or all of the opinion. Nor have I included it in my statistical survey. For
discussion of that opinion, see infra notes 48-49, 53, 100-08.
37. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983).
38. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In his article, Scalia also used the ripeness doctrine to deny relief in
two cases. After observing that ripeness can be part of the "case and controversy"
requirement of article III of the Constitution, he held that railroads could not challenge an
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explicitly acknowledge that standing and separation of powers are
intimately related."39
In several of his own opinions, Scalia has made it more difficult
for plaintiffs to have standing. In Community Nutrition Institute v.
Block,4° the majority held that individuals could challenge USDA
milk regulations that raised prices. Scalia replied in his dissent that
although the Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.) admittedly
expanded standing, "[g]overnmental mischief whose effects are widely
distributed is more readily remedied through the political process,
and does not call into play the distinctive function of the courts as
guardians against oppression of the few by the many.
41
Scalia's conception of standing is myopic. Economic injury has
been the classic justification for standing ever since Association of
Data Process Service Organizations v. Camp,42 in which the Supreme
Court upheld a challenge by data processors to the Comptroller of
Currency's ruling that national banks could make their data process-
ing services available to other banks and bank customers. Scalia is
correct in arguing that combating majority oppression is the primary
function of the federal courts; however, courts also have a duty to
combat minority oppression, particularly when a minority has seized
excessive control of an administrative agency. As contemporary
political scientists have pointed out, diffuse groups are frequently vul-
nerable to well-organized interest groups, who can easily capture
administrative agencies that regulate their activities. 43 If each con-
Interstate Commerce Commission alteration of the accounting method they used to depreciate
improvements to their tracks because the rule had no immediate impact. He also refused to
hear Air New Zealand's challenge to the Civil Aeronautic Board's (C.A.B.) denial of a special
rate which the airline requested because it feared that the government of New Zealand would
retaliate. Scalia narrowly read the two-pronged test in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
which provided that a case is ripe if it is "fit" for resolution and if injury is immediate. 387
U.S. 136 (1967). Scalia's "fitness" test was very tough to satisfy: "No one asserts, in other
words, that the Board's condition is, in all its applications, substantively invalid." Yet the
drug companies in Abbott Laboratories had not claimed that the labelling requirements were
invalid in all their applications. Scalia also concluded that no immediate injury existed
because New Zealand had not yet retaliated, and the C.A.B. had not yet punished the airline
for complying with New Zealand's contradictory requests. Yet, in Abbott Laboratories, the
Federal Drug Administration had not yet initiated prosecutions against Abbott Laboratories
for failing to comply with the new labelling requirements. Scalia might reply that the labelling
procedures in Abbott Laboratories were expensive, while Air New Zealand did not immediately
incur any expenses.
39. Scalia, supra note 37, at 897-98.
40. 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
41. Id. at 1256.
42. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
43. See, e.g., R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); C. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977); T. Lowi, END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
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sumer has only lost pennies, how many consumers are going to strug-
gle through the political process to rectify the abuse? Scalia also
discounted the underlying policy of the A.P.A. to provide judicial
review to injured citizens.' Finally, he ignored the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. SCRAP,45 in which the Court granted
standing to environmentalists challenging the Interstate Commerce
Commission's authorization of a 2.5% surcharge on nearly all freight
rates on the grounds that the increased rates would raise prices,
increase pollution, increase taxes, and discourage use of reusable
waste materials. Some of the environmentalists' injuries were more
attenuated than the specific injury to consumer pocketbooks of
increased milk prices.
Corporations, but not consumers, will more likely have standing
to challenge adverse agency actions. For example, Scalia granted
standing to brokers who challenged a regulation preventing them
from distributing more than $100,000 to any bank that was federally
insured for any account up to $100,000.46 On the other hand, Scalia
denied standing to an ex-shipbuilder challenging federal regulations
because the plaintiff had not built ships in years and was seeking relief
that would not make it likely that he would build ships again.4" Nor
do all civil rights litigants lose access arguments. Before ruling
against them on the merits, Scalia found that a film distributor and
several would-be exhibitors had standing to contest the Justice
44. Scalia also narrowly construed the A.P.A in Gott v. Walters. 756 F.2d 902 (D.C.
Cir.), vacated, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985). He upheld the Veteran's Administration's
refusal to comply with the A.P.A. notice and comment requirements for rulemaking because
the VA's enabling statute precluded federal court review. He distinguished Johnson v. Robison
on the ground that it involved a constitutional claim. Id. at 906 (citing Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361 (1974)). He cited his article on Vermont Yankee to support his thesis that the
court should not graft additional procedures onto agencies. Id. at 908 (citing Scalia, Vermont
Yankee: The APA, the D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345). His
response to the dissent's use of subsequent legislative history, a technique sometimes used by
the Supreme Court, dripped in sarcasm: "A brief word is necessary concerning the dissent's
use of what has become known (with a disappointing lack of sense for the paradoxical) as
'subsequent legislative history.'" Id. at 914.
45. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
46. FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
47. Scalia also expressed in this case his controversial idea that because legislative history
is not a very useful interpretive source for statutes, judges should primarily rely upon the text.
Id. at 362. This article shall not discuss the political impact of different strategies for
interpreting statutes. That subject is outside the scope of this article, but needs much more
exploration. In another example of conservative efforts to reformulate statutory construction,
Judges Posner and Easterbrook have proposed that the breadth of judicial creativity should
depend upon the degree of specificity of the statutory language. Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domain, 50 U. CM. L. REV. 533 (1983); Lander & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
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Department's labelling several films "political propaganda."4 Even if
the public reaction was "irrational," some purchasers may have been
deterred from purchasing the film because they feared public hostility
triggered by the label and by disclosure of their purchase.4 9
Scalia has been unsympathetic to the "chilling effects" and the
"overbreadth doctrine," two concepts the Supreme Court has some-
times used to create extensive first amendment protection. Under
those themes, parties could have standing either because they were
intimidated from speaking or because the challenged governmental
action clearly impaired protected speech of other citizens. In United
Presbyterian Church v. Reagan,50 Scalia held that a subjective chill
was not enough.5 1 The plaintiffs had "not adequately averred that
any specific action [was] threatened or even contemplated against
them."52 They only had a "generalized grievance" against presiden-
tial orders that updated directives on how to process intelligence
data.53
In that same case, Scalia narrowly construed the D.C. Circuit
doctrine of "equitable discretion," a doctrine which grants greater
standing to legislators who challenge executive action than to average
citizens. Scalia dismissed Congressman Dellum's challenge against
the presidential orders because his complaint was "a generalized
grievance about the conduct of government, not a claim founded on
injury to the legislator by distortion of the process by which a bill
becomes law."
54
When a group of Nicaraguans, congressional members, and Flor-
ida residents sued the President to stop supporting the Contras, Scalia
48. Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
49. Id. at 1308-09.
50. 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Judge Bork joined Judge Scalia on this opinion.
51. Id. at 1378.
52. Id. at 1380.
53. Id. at 1381. In Block v. Meese, Scalia also denied standing to film distributors
challenging the vagueness of "political propaganda" labelling. 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
He explained: "[I]t is beyond imagination how anyone except the foreign agent would have
standing to complain about the vagueness of the statutory command." Id. at 1315.
54. United Presbyterian Church, 738 F.2d at 1382. Even Professor Ronald Dworkin might
concur with Scalia's distinction. Why should congressional members have a broad
constitutional right to more access to the courts than the average citizen? Allowing
congressional members to challenge virtually any statute or executive action while prohibiting
ordinary citizens from exercising the same power arguably violates Dworkin's concept of
"equal concern and respect." See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). On the other hand, federal legislators are
distinctively injured when the executive branch violates constitutional procedures for creating
legislation. They should be able to challenge executive interference with the lawmaking
process such as an improper use of the pocket veto. Otherwise, such profound violations of
constitutional provisions would probably be unreviewable.
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applied the totally preclusive political question doctrine to only one of
the claims, the contention that the President violated the War Powers
Act. Scalia held that the War Powers Act was designed to resolve
interbranch responsibilities during armed hostilities, not to provide
individuals with a federal court forum or to grant them damages. 55
Turning to the remaining claims, Scalia held that the plaintiffs could
not proceed under the sequel to the 1789 Judiciary Act (now codified
in the Judicial Code) because they had to allege sovereignty, and sov-
ereign immunity had not been waived either by that act or by the
Administrative Procedure Act.56 Nor could aliens claim relief under
either the fourth or fifth amendment because the federal courts were
institutionally incompetent to design a remedy: "We must leave to
Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist.""
By rarely using the political question defense, which totally prevents
judicial review, Scalia created a flexible, discretionary jurisprudence.
He then used that discretion against the plaintiffs.
Judge Scalia's dissent in Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger,5" an
en banc decision which reversed his earlier decision, demonstrates his
ability to weave through complex procedural and substantive issues to
reach a conclusion which may not in itself be heartless, but which
leaves behind many barriers to broad judicial review. Ramirez de
Arellano, a United States citizen, sued on his own behalf and as a
shareholder of his foreign corporation to have United States military
forces enjoined from continuing to occupy his ranch in Honduras.
The majority held that the military had violated Ramirez de Arel-
lano's due process rights, and consequently should be evicted.
Scalia did not hold that the issue was a nonjusticiable political
question for three reasons: the adjudication of land disputes is a func-
tion of the courts; no confidential documents were needed to resolve
the case; and the impact on foreign affairs did not provide the govern-
55. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
56. Id. at 207. Scalia also mentioned sovereign immunity in Asociacion de Reclamantes v.
United Mexican States when he denied damages to Mexicans seeking compensation for the
alleged taking and conversion of twelve million acres that they previously owned in Texas. 735
F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Scalia decided the case primarily on statutory grounds. Id. at
1525; see also Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public Land Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970) (Scalia
has criticized broad use of sovereign immunity.).
Scalia referred to the language in the 1789 Act because it forms the basis for the language
in the present Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
57. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209.
58. 745 F.2d 1500, 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'g 724 F.2d 143 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
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ment with a complete defense.5 9 Ramirez de Arellano had standing as
a United States citizen to raise constitutional complaints, but did not
have standing as a shareholder of his foreign corporation.' Other-
wise, any shareholder could sue any governmental official who was
injuring that shareholder's corporation. Scalia thus used the standing
doctrine to preclude a shareholder who had been injured in fact.
Although Scalia did not rule against Ramirez de Arellano on
access grounds, he suggested that the court deny relief because the
majority's injunctive remedy inappropriately violated separation of
powers principles and conflicted with "common sense."'61  Scalia
noted that the case concerned a military operation abroad in a
friendly country. The plaintiff never filed suit in that country, nor did
the plaintiff seek damages that were available under the Tucker Act
for any unconstitutional taking.62 Thus, Scalia did not draw a bright
line, broadly construing the political question doctrine to preclude
relief in all foreign affairs cases, but instead invoked the foreign affairs
limitation on judicial review to deny the requested remedy. He
retained some flexibility, but put pressure on the remedy of injunctive
relief, a major tool of many civil rights litigants. Nevertheless, his
decision was not totally deferential to the government because the
plaintiff still could pursue the alternative remedy of damages.
Sometimes a relatively insignificant case can best capture a
jurist's sympathy for constitutional claims. In Carducci v. Regan,63
instead of ordering a remand, Scalia dismissed a civil servant's due
process challenge to a reassignment partially because the plaintiff had
not adequately briefed whether his interest was a constitutionally pro-
tected property right.
B. First Amendment
No case more dramatically demonstrates Scalia's reluctance to
read the first amendment broadly than his dissenting opinion in
Olman v. Evans,64 an opinion that was particularly critical of a con-
currence by Judge Bork. The opinion of the court reversed a jury find-
ing that the conservative political columnists Rowland Evans and
Robert Novack had libeled Professor Bertell Ollman because the col-
umnists had engaged in protected opinion. The columnists had
59. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 745
F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). Judge Bork joined Scalia in this opinion.
60. Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1556.
61. Ramirez de Arellano, 724 F.2d at 156.
62. Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1561.
63. 714 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
64. 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1186
CONSTRAINTS OF POWER
attacked Ollman, a Marxist, when the University of Maryland consid-
ered making him head of the political science department. According
to the opinion of the court, the defendants' use of such phrases as
"political Marxist" or "activist" were so hopelessly imprecise as to
preclude a finding of libel.65 Columnists tend to engage in such
hyperbole as "Ollman has no status within the profession but is a pure
and simple activist." 6
6
Because Judge Bork assembled so many themes that he had pre-
viously explored in his academic writings and because Judge Scalia
reserved his most biting counterattacks for Judge Bork's concurrence,
I am going to digress temporarily from this article's structure of sepa-
rately presenting each of the judge's opinions by now presenting
Bork's Olman concurrence in some depth. The following debate is
intriguing because it demonstrates major similarities as well as differ-
ences in the two judges' jurisprudence. We also should spend some
time studying Bork's views because Scalia may find them attractive.
In his academic writings, Judge Bork has maintained that the
Framers' intentions are the touchstone for all legitimate constitutional
interpretation. Applying that theory to the first amendment, Bork
concluded that not only did the Framers intend to protect political
speech by passing the first amendment, 67 but also that the Constitu-
tion would protect the structure of political speech even if the first
amendment did not exist. On the other hand, Bork later wrote that
welfare rights could never be found in the equal protection clause
because they are "new rights."' 68 Therefore, according to Bork, such
rights cannot be inferred from text, history, structure, or precedent-
the only "legitimate" sources of constitutional interpretation. In
Olman, Bork concluded that his assumptions did not preclude some
alteration of constitutional doctrine:
In a case like this, it is the task of the judge in this generation to
discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world
they knew, apply to the world we know. The world changes in
which unchanging values find their application. The fourth
amendment was framed by men who did not foresee electronic sur-
veillance. But that does not make it wrong for judges to apply the
65. Id. at 987.
66. Id. at 989.
67. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
In that same article, Judge Bork also relied upon Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v.
California, to help define the scope of protected speech. Id. at 32 (citing Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)). In Olman, Bork made another reference to Brandeis'
concurrence. 750 F.2d at 1002.
68. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH.
L.Q. 695.
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central value of that amendment to electronic invasions of personal
privacy.
69
Bork proposed a new doctrinal defense to libel. Under this
defense, the court should apply a balancing test weighted against
politically active plaintiffs who "have entered the fray."' 70 This bal-
ancing test would be both substantive and procedural. Activist plain-
tiffs would need to prove more than malice to prevail. Even if such a
plaintiff proved malice, the defendant could sometimes successfully
assert that the false statement was hyperbole. 71 Bork concluded that
such complex determinations were not fit for juries because juries are
generally incompetent to handle first amendment cases.72
Bork's doctrinal solution, one I happen to agree with, partially
destabilized his basic constitutional jurisprudence that courts should
only rely on text, history, precedent, and structure to interpret the
Constitution. By including assessments about changing circum-
stances, jury error, and the need for evolutionary doctrine, Bork
seemed to be overtly endorsing some of the flexible techniques that
liberal realists claim all Supreme Court Justices actually use and
ought to use.
Scalia scolded Bork for overtly embracing such evolutionary
views, both as a mode of argument and as applied to the particular
issue. Scalia thus fell into the theoretical quagmire he had usually
avoided as a scholar. According to Scalia, the existing malice doc-
trine was perfectly adequate. 73 Indeed, the media currently has exces-
sive power, sometimes engaging in sensationalistic investigative
reporting, "a distressing tendency for our political commentary to
descend from discussion of public issues to destruction of private rep-
utations. ' '74 According to Scalia, the legislature should be the pri-
mary forum for constitutional evolution:
It seems to me that the identification of "modern problems" to be
remedied is quintessentially legislative rather than judicial busi-
ness-largely because it is such a subjective judgment; and that the
remedies are to be sought through democratic change rather than
69. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 995. Bork also endorsed the Supreme Court's expansive readings
of the commerce clause, of the equal protection clause to desegregate the schools in Brown v.
Board of Educ., and of the first amendment to create the malice standard to protect the media
from libel suits by public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at 996-97 (citing New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
70. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 1002.
71. Id. at 1005.
72. Id. at 1006.
73. Id. at 1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1039.
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through judicial pronouncement .. .
Scalia proposed a distinction as ambiguous as some of Bork's distinc-
tions to explain why the court can regulate electronic eavesdropping
but not change libel laws:
The application of existing principles to new phenomena--either
new because they have not existed before or new because they have
never been presented to a court before-is not what I would call
"evolution" but merely routine elaboration of the law. What is
under discussion here is not application of preexisting principles to
new phenomena, but rather alteration of preexisting principles in
their application to preexisting phenomena on the basis of judicial
perception of changed social circumstances.76
A major problem with Scalia's description of constitutional law
is that constitutional decision-making since the time of Chief Justice
Marshall has never been "routine elaboration of the law." Further-
more, Scalia's theory may commit him to the status quo far more than
Bork. Both men are wary of judicial novelty, be it "new rights" or
"new principles," but Scalia also apparently opposes any "alteration
of preexisting principles in their application." It is unclear what
Scalia meant by such opposition, but he may have meant that all con-
stitutional doctrine must be immediately and totally ossified, or that
the courts should revert to doctrine existing at the time of the Fram-
ers unless there is a new technology, a "new phenomenon." If the
latter is the case, then seditious libel laws are constitutional because
courts used such a doctrine to regulate newspapers at the time of the
ratification of the first amendment." On the other hand, he may have
created an escape hatch during this esoteric conservative fight.
Because constitutional litigants are frequently requesting new relief to
new problems, he can characterize any doctrinal shift as appropriate
because the phenomenon had never been presented to the court
before. Yet, no court had previously considered giving special protec-
tion to columnists who are sued for libel by those who chose to be
politically active. The line between new phenomena and new doc-
trine, which itself is a phenomenon, borders on the mystical.
This argument in favor of the status quo may come back to haunt
Scalia in other areas of constitutional law. How can he find all forms
of affirmative action to be unconstitutional or overrule abortion rights
when those phenomena already exist and have already been presented
75. Id. at 1038.
76. Id. at 1038 n.2 (citations omitted).
77. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1985). Professor Levy recently wrote that the
doctrine of seditious libel significantly influenced newspapers. See Levy, The Legacy
Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 (1985).
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to the Court? How can he expand doctrine denying equitable relief to
the Honduran rancher on the grounds of "common sense," which
sounds like a method of identifying and rectifying modem problems?
How can he alter the doctrine of standing to deny milk consumers
their day in court? In short, this bizarre debate between Bork and
Scalia, filled with vague distinctions, demonstrates the awkward posi-
tions conservative theorists may assume when they forget Edmund
Burke's admonition that one of the greatest strengths of conservatism
is its flexibility. I do not mean to suggest that Burke easily solved the
distinction between right and wrong political action; he labelled
changes he liked "reforms" and changes he did not like "innova-
tions." Burke at least avoided such superficially mechanical words,
tests, and theories as legitimacy and subjectivity.
In Tavoulareas v. Piro,78 Scalia joined Judge McKinnon in
upholding a jury decision that the Washington Post libeled William
Tavoulareas, head of Mobil Oil, when it published an article alleging
corporate nepotism. Unlike Bork, McKinnon and Scalia thought the
appellate court should be totally deferential to jury findings, including
credibility findings.79 McKinnon also echoed Scalia's wariness of the
media, as expressed in Olman; the jury could consider, as part of its
analysis, that the Post's aggressive policy of investigative reporting
helped cause the libel. 8° Furthermore, the jury could infer malice by
observing the inferences drawn by the Post editors.8'
Scalia again deferred to jury resolutions of libel cases when he
reversed a summary judgment decision in favor of columnist Jack
Anderson, whom extreme right-wingers had sued for libel.82 Scalia
held that the trial court should not have held that a plaintiff must
prove his or her case by "clear and convincing" evidence at the sum-
mary judgment stage instead of by a "preponderance" of the evidence.
Scalia held that such an enhanced standard would force the plaintiff
to try the entire case before trial and would frustrate the Supreme
Court's position that summary judgment is disfavored in libel cases.83
Scalia agreed that opinions, journalistic inaccuracies, and political
opinions (including Anderson's calling someone a "liar") were
78. 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id. at 125.
82. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court
of the United States recently reversed this decision on the ground that a trial court should use
the "clear and convincing" standard at the summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
83. Anderson, 746 F.2d at 1570-71; see also supra note 82 (discussing the Supreme Court
opinion).
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protected forms of speech. 4 Other statements were not malicious
because the editor could rely upon such reputable sources as trials,
some articles, and statements made by previous employees.8 5
Anderson, however, should have known that some of his information
was based upon an unreliable source, a magazine article that had been
the source of a prior libel action which generated a settlement.8 6
Anderson also should not have relied upon Eringer, a suspect inform-
ant who claimed that the plaintiff was a Hitler-imitator, because
although "Eringer was identified by name, ...he was in all other
respects unknown to [Anderson]. 8 7 Scalia has reduced the reckless-
ness component of the "malice" standard to a negligence, malpractice
standard. Assuming that the standard should exist at all, it should
punish only gross journalistic sloppiness which can only be explained
as the equivalent of malicious motivation.
These libel cases dramatize the confusion in Scalia's constitu-
tional jurisprudence. When Judge Bork expanded first amendment
jurisprudence because he perceived contemporary deficiencies with
existing libel law, 8 Scalia castigated Bork's expansion as a usurpation
of the legislature, which is best equipped to solve "modern problems."
But Scalia did not hesitate to relax libel standards, both in definition
and application, because of his belief that the news media presently
have too much power.
Scalia also limited media power when he denied reporters access
to prejudgment documents in a civil case. 9 Scalia first observed that
84. Anderson, 746 F.2d at 1574.
85. Id. at 1574-75.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1579.
88. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
89. In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Scalia did not rely upon Professor Ronald Dworkin's argument that the press has no
special access right greater than the rights of any other citizen and that such a unique right
would violate Dworkin's core principle of "equal concern and respect." R. DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 54, at 373-97. There are interesting similarities between
Dworkin's "equal concern and respect" jurisprudence and these jurists' theories of
constitutional law. Dworkin draws a line between "principle" and "policy," requiring courts
to enforce the former. The conservative judges distinguish between "core rights" and "new
rights," banishing the latter as illegitimate. Although anyone engaged in constitutional law
must make a "reasoned" distinction between winners and losers, all these men tend to act as if
their systems were remarkably determinate, even self-evident, and can explain the most subtle
constitutional issues.
I remain one of those skeptics who believe that many important constitutional issues do
not have one "right answer," but have many tolerable, "legitimate" solutions. Once we get
beyond such tyrannical practices as torture, apartheid, concentration camps, and content
discrimination in speech, I am reluctant to ban as "illegitimate" or as "wrong" numerous
constitutional opinions with which I disagree. Nor do I have any single technique to resolve
such collateral issues (just as I have no automatic test to define "tyranny"). In other words, I
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although the Supreme Court had not decided this particular issue of
press access, it decided similar cases by studying the history of press
access and by sometimes favoring access because the press plays "an
essential role in the proper functioning of the judicial process and the
government as a whole." 9 Sounding like Bork, Scalia wrote that his-
tory and text were the exclusive sources of constitutional interpreta-
tion: "With neither the constraint of history nor the constraint of
historical practice, nothing would separate the judicial task of consti-
tutional interpretation from the political task of enacting laws cur-
rently deemed essential." 91 Whenever the text and history conflict,
however, the text should prevail:
If the holding falls directly within the text of the constitu-
tional provision-as ... where not an implied right of access but
the expressly protected right of "freedom of speech" was at issue-
historical practice may be relegated to a lesser role, serving not as a
sine qua non but as an important tool for interpretation. 92
Scalia concluded that the press had no special right to access.
First, he narrowed the rationale for access, reducing the first amend-
ment to a tool to help the government function rather than also char-
acterizing it as an individual right. The public's interest is
constitutionally irrelevant; the "focus is upon the public's ability to
assure proper functioning of the courts." 93 Scalia also invoked practi-
cal policy reasons: "The dissent's categorical rule that no claim for
confidentiality of trial exhibits can be sustained unless accompanied
by a document-by-document justification is simply unworkable." 94
Scalia's argument about adequate judicial remedy was relevant and
appropriate, and is perhaps even convincing. What is notable about
such an argument, however, is its distance from text and history.
believe that the Supreme Court has "legitimate discretion" to resolve many constitutional
issues in significantly different ways. I worship neither Hercules nor the Framers.
Some readers might wonder, then, why I have cited Dworkin. First, I agree with much of
what he says. Consistency and equality are major legal virtues. I also wanted to show how
one of Scalia's opinions was directly supported by Dworkin's writings and how another might
be. And as I noted above, somehow all of us must explain why we support and reject different
opinions, and these men have provided us with valuable guidelines. But I remain reluctant to
make any single test the exclusive test, the litmus test. Not only does such an approach reduce
needed flexibility, but it also is ultimately an illusion. A mysterious, foggy gap still remains
between such abstractions as "core rights" or "equal concern and respect" and application of
those abstractions to specific issues. I like that fog. Our ignorance is simultaneously
constraining and liberating.
90. In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d at 1331.
91. Id. at 1332.
92. Id. at 1332 n.5.
93. Id. at 1337 n.9.
94. Id. at 1341.
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When pressured, Scalia leaves text and history behind, and engages in
basic policy arguments about "common sense," "remedy," and
''proper functioning."
If the "core" of the first amendment is political speech, then the
crucial doctrinal test is whether the regulation is content neutral.
Judge Scalia joined Judge Bork in invalidating a ban of a poster in a
public subway which falsely showed President Reagan mocking a
group of poor people at a dinner; the artist placed a photograph of
President Reagan over the figure who was ridiculing the impover-
ished.95 But Scalia has whittled at the edges of the content neutrality
doctrine. In Molerio v. FB.L.,96 he upheld the F.B.I.'s decision to
turn down an applicant's request to be a special agent in part because
the applicant's father had been involved in radical, pro-Castro groups.
Scalia noted that the F.B.I. could discriminate against a person
because of his father's acts, but not because of his father's speeches. 97
Even assuming that such discrimination can be constitutional, Scalia
created a large procedural hurdle for plaintiffs seeking to prove which
"type" of discrimination occurred. He upheld the trial court's affir-
mation of the F.B.I.'s actions based upon an F.B.I. affidavit.9" Courts
should give "considerable deference to the views of the executive
department as to what sort of matter would impair national
security." 99
Scalia's belief that the judiciary should be particularly deferential
to the executive in its handling of foreign affairs helps explain Block v.
Meese,1°° published just after his nomination to the Supreme Court.
The plaintiffs challenged the Justice Department's description of three
films made by the Canadian government as "political propaganda"
and its requirement that the distributor disclose the names of all those
organizations that exhibited the films. Two of the films studied acid
rain, and the other portrayed the perils of nuclear war. 1 ' Scalia first
rejected the plaintiffs' statutory argument that Congress only passed
the statute requiring registration of "political propaganda" to combat
"subversive propaganda." Making Professor Dworkin's classic argu-
ment that courts are to implement the "concept" of a text, not the
Framers' specific "conception" of the mischief that motivated initial
95. Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
96. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
97. Id. at 824 n.4, 825.
98. Id. at 822. Scalia also reviewed the affidavit. Id.
99. Id.
100. 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Judge Bork was on the unanimous panel.).
101. Id. at 1306.
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passage of the text, 102 Scalia dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that
the Justice Department's actions exceeded the original purpose of the
statute: "While the investigations which led to the FARA's enact-
ment were undoubtedly aimed at 'subversive propaganda'. . . the stat-
ute as drawn was not so narrow .... 103 This argument of inferring
goals beyond the Framers' intentions is, of course, one liberals fre-
quently rely upon in many opinions that the conservatives have
argued are "illegitimate."
Turning to plaintiffs' first amendment argument, Scalia observed
that the government could constitutionally identify "an objective phe-
nomenon that is suspect."'" The government had no constitutional
duty to comply with the plaintiffs' request that "political advocacy"
be substituted for "political propaganda" because those words were so
similar. Scalia quoted Professor Tribe, "an eminent constitutional
scholar not noted for a crabbed view of the first amendment," to sup-
port his argument that the government could actively participate in
the marketplace of ideas. 0 5 Tribe, however, might reply that there is
a constitutional distinction between the government's criticizing a
film and the government's labelling and monitoring of a film. The
Justice Department could, therefore, evaluate these films. Not only
would the courts have practical problems determining when the gov-
ernment spoke properly if they started regulating its speech, but the
courts also would be regulating political speech. Courts should only
intervene if the government is suppressing another's speech, not when
it is disparaging that speech. 106 Yet the government had gone beyond
criticism; it had begun to regulate and to monitor with the intent to
discourage distribution and viewing.
In Block, Scalia applied a balancing test to uphold the govern-
ment requirement that the names of all exhibitors of such films be
disclosed. The public's interest to know, which Scalia had dismissed
when reporters sought increased court access in Oilman, now became
constitutionally relevant, although not compelling: "This interest in
public awareness is not, we are inclined to think, a state interest of the
highest importance. "107 Scalia suddenly became an advocate of media
access. Because mainly the national press used such information,
nondisclosure would be "less a vindication than a frustration of first
102. R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 54, at 33-71.
103. Block, 793 F.2d at 1310.
104. Id. at 1312.
105. Id. at 1314.
106. Id. at 1315.
107. Id. at 1316.
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amendment values."10 8
In his dissent in Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Watt, 109
Scalia narrowly construed and applied the "speech-conduct" distinc-
tion. His analysis has dramatic practical impact on activists' ability to
be heard, particularly if they are not wealthy. Even when deciding
cases far removed from foreign affairs, Scalia held that judicial defer-
ence to executive action prevailed over a broad definition of one of our
most crucial constitutional rights; he upheld the Department of Inte-
rior's refusal to permit demonstrators to sleep in tents they had set up
at LaFayette Square to dramatize the problem of the homeless. In an
opinion, which Judge Easterbrook later endorsed in a Harvard Law
Review foreword, ° Scalia accepted the Department's argument that
the regulation against camping had been neutrally applied to all
groups so that the public could use and enjoy LaFayette Park, even
though that park had previously been the source of numerous demon-
strations and even though many homeless persons would not come to
the demonstration if they could not sleep in the tents. Easterbrook
applauded Scalia's argument that allowing one group to camp would
probably lead to the admission of other groups, a process which
would defeat the purpose of the no camping regulation."1 1
Scalia's analysis is far more provocative than his conclusion.
After all, the prohibition was arguably constitutional because the park
did not have to let the plaintiffs set up the tents in the first place, and
because lines had to be drawn somewhere for time, place, and manner
restrictions. Also, other political protesters who might want camp
sites might have been able to allege content-based discrimination if
they were denied such a privilege after the demonstrators against the
homeless had received it. But in the course of resolving this difficult
case, Scalia applied the ambiguous speech-content distinction to cre-
ate new troublesome distinctions and tests. Courts should apply
heightened judicial scrutiny only if the government limits "effective
speech." 1 2 Scalia concluded that only spoken and written communi-
cation are forms of "effective speech," entitled to far more judicial
108. Id. at 1317.
109. 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir 1983) (Judge Bork concurred in the Scalia opinion.).
110. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
111. Easterbrook described this classic "slippery slope" argument as an economic
interpretation appropriately sensitive to how a decision having marginally insignificant costs
can ultimately lead to decisions which generate undesirable results. Id. at 13. For a discussion
of slippery slopes that is not cast in economic imagery, see Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 361 (1985).
112. Watt, 703 F.2d at 623.
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protection than "point-making conduct." ' 3 Such traditional forms of
protest, such as marches and picketing, fall into a netherland of
"speech plus."'1 14 Applying these definitions to the facts, Scalia
tersely noted that sleep is "self-evidently" not "effective speech.""' 5
Indeed, sleep is not speech at all; the Court should rely upon "com-
mon and common-sense understanding" to make the needed distinc-
tions. 11 6 Scalia then held that courts should never apply intermediate
scrutiny to activities labelled "conduct" unless the plaintiff could
show improper motivation: "But a law proscribing conduct for a rea-
son having nothing to do with its communicative character need only
meet the ordinary minimal requirements of the equal protection
clause."1 17
Scalia both limited and confused his motive test by stating that
the plaintiff could prove improper motive only if the bad motive was
the only reason for the challenged act. 1 8 Yet many cases involve
mixed motives. The law will have something to do with the conduct's
communicative character, meeting Scalia's test in favor of the plain-
tiff. That same law, however, may also have been passed for other
reasons, satisfying his second test, which requires a verdict for the
defendant.
These tests conflict with the reasoning of such Supreme Court
decisions as Tinker v. Des Moines School District,II 9 which held that
school administrators could not prohibit students from wearing black
arm bands protesting the Vietnam War. Tinker demonstrates the
uncertainties contained in Scalia's doctrine. Certainly the prohibition
against armbands had something to do with their "communicative
character," meeting Scalia's first test. But the administrators may
have been worried about safety or school disruption; unconstitutional
content-based suppression may not have been their "only reason."
Finally, how can Scalia justify this confused constriction of existing
doctrine with his jurisprudential argument in Olman that courts
should only apply "existing principles" to "new phenomena"? Are
his constrictions "existing principles"? How can we tell if these new
definitions, standards, and theories are "improper alterations" or
"legitimate applications"? And how do we determine if sleep is a
"new phenomenon," compared to armbands?
113. Id. at 622.
114. Id. at 623.
115. Id. at 624.
116. Id. at 622.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 624-25.
119. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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However the reader might answer such quasi-physical questions,
Scalia will apparently resolve most doubts about both his doctrinal
and jurisprudential tests in favor of the government. He places on the
legislatures the responsibility for protecting this segment of the first
amendment. So long as they remain "neutral," temporary electoral
majorities may totally regulate how minorities can use nonverbal
forms of their most important right-the right to criticize, even to
displace, that majority. Political pressures alone must prevent the
government from "neutrally" proscribing all expressive conduct.12 0
C. Procedural Due Process
Scalia only wrote three opinions discussing the due process
clause. None is of great importance, although all three demonstrate
his reluctance to impose any supplemental procedures upon govern-
ment agencies. In two of those cases he ruled against the plaintiffs
because they had not met the threshold requirement of proving they
had a constitutionally protected "liberty" or "property interest." In
Molerio v. FB..,'2 ' he held that a person applying to be an F.B.I.
special agent had no property interest in the job. Nor could the plain-
tiff claim his liberty was impaired. He had no constitutionally pro-
tected reputation interest, he was not stigmatized because one could
be denied a F.B.I. job and still be considered loyal, and the govern-
ment had not broadly published the denial of the job.122
In Carducci v. Regan, 23 Scalia dismissed a civil servant's chal-
lenge to a reassignment partially because the due process issue had
not been adequately briefed, while cryptically suggesting that consti-
tutional claims are not limited by statutory structure, unless Congress
so indicates. 124 Even assuming that Scalia should have dismissed Car-
ducci's due process claim instead of remanding it, his opinion was
ambiguous. He noted that hearing evidence outside the record was a
classic due process violation 25 and that the Constitution can mandate
more procedures than currently exist under positive law. Yet he also
stated that the court should not impose constitutional procedures
where Congress has spoken clearly.1 26 So what happens if Congress
clearly authorizes ex parte communications?
In the one case where the plaintiff may have had a constitution-
120. Watt, 703 F.2d at 626.
121. 749 F.2d 815, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 924.
123. 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
124. Id. at 173-74.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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ally protected interest, Scalia deferred to existing judicial interpreta-
tions of the positive law: "Federal courts would hardly interpret the
unspecified 'full hearing' requirement of § 205(e) to permit proce-
dures so inadequate that, if the due process clause were applicable,
they would not pass muster."'' 27 Such deference to the positive law
and to existing procedures coincides with the views Scalia expressed
when he wrote an article 28 explaining why the Supreme Court so
harshly criticized the D.C. Circuit for imposing additional procedural
requirements upon the Environmental Protection Agency in Vermont
Yankee v. Natural Resources Defense Council.1 29
Although Judge Scalia has not written any opinions applying
substantive due process, he joined Judge Bork in holding that the
Navy could discharge a serviceman for being homosexual. 30
Although his judicial viewpoint on abortion remains uncertain, Scalia
has personally spoken out against abortion, and in a debate, criticized
the Supreme Court for imposing its own values on the electorate by
providing constitutional protection to women seeking an abortion. 13 1
D. Equal Protection
Judge Scalia has written two opinions construing the equal pro-
tection clause. In Molerio v. FB.L ,13 discussed above, Scalia denied
the plaintiff's claim that he was discriminated against because he was
Cuban. Scalia observed that the F.B.I. had good reasons for denying
the plaintiff his clearance, even though he never said what those rea-
sons were. The F.B.I. was neither creating a pretext nor acting
unconstitutionally when it denied Molerio's application to become an
F.B.I. special agent because he still had relatives in Cuba. 3 3 Scalia's
opinion partially revives that dark moment in our history when the
Court upheld the internment of the Japanese-Americans during
World War II.'3  Government agencies can discriminate against peo-
ple because of their national origin when national security is at stake.
Admittedly, there are major differences between the cases, but those
127. City of Cleveland v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 773 F.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
128. Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
Sup. CT. REV. 345.
129. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
130. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
131. In His Own Words: Antonin Scalia on Abortion, Bias and Libel, N.Y. Times, June 19,
1986, at D 27, col. 1.
132. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
133. Id. at 823.
134. The Supreme Court deferred to the military's judgment that Japanese-Americans
should be put in camps. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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distinctions cut both ways. On the one hand, Molerio's interest in a
new job was hardly as important as the Japanese-American citizens'
right to physical liberty. On the other hand, the government's need to
win World War II transcended any F.B.I. security anxiety concerning
Molerio.
In United States v. Cohen, 35 Scalia rejected an equal protection
challenge to a District of Columbia law that automatically committed
to mental institutions all who were found not guilty by reason of
insanity, even though federal law in the rest of the country required
immediate release unless the state committed the defendant. Missing
the point, Scalia sardonically observed that no fundamental right
exists to commit a crime while insane.' 36 Nor was there a fundamen-
tal right to equal sentencing.' 37 Scalia distinguished Skinner v.
Oklahoma on the ground that the gravity of Skinner's punishment,
involuntary sterilization, raised a due process claim, not an equal pro-
tection claim. 138
The plaintiffs in Cohen, Scalia argued, were not members of any
suspect class. They were not the victims of congressional animus,
they had no immutable traits, and they were not a politically power-
less group. 39 Nor did District of Columbia residents have any right
to intermediate scrutiny."4° He then referred to John Hinckley's
shooting of President Reagan to argue that the District might even
need special protection against mentally ill criminals. ' 4 ' Scalia con-
cluded with yet another paean to deference: Congress could gradually
reform the District's laws without judicial interference. 42
E. Government Structure
As seen throughout the above opinions, judicial deference has
been a major theme in Scalia's writings and opinions. He has been
particularly deferential to the Executive when it is involved in foreign
affairs. In a relatively insignificant rate case, Scalia digressed to pres-
ent a broad theory of autonomous executive power, a controversial
theory which seems to undercut the Supreme Court opinion in
135. 733 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
136. Id. at 133.
137. Id. at 134.
138. Id. at 134 n.il.
139. Id. at 134-35.
140. Id. at 136 n.12.
141. Id. at 138.
142. Id.
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, '4 3 and Youngstown's two classic
concurrences written by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson.
144
Scalia argued that the President may have some implied powers that
cannot be constitutionally displaced by Congress. He offered as an
example an executive decision that the "Navy should use a foreign
ship, faster and less vulnerable than any American ship available, to
deliver urgently needed supplies to troops in wartime."' 45 Does his
example suggest that the President can ignore any congressional stat-
ute during wartime, even one outlawing such seizures, or does Scalia
only mean that in times of great urgency the President can act
because he or she does not have time to get congressional approval?
Scalia's deference to Congress is also limited by his bright-line
conception of separation of powers, a conception that tends to favor
the Executive.' 46 One of his most influential law review articles
articulated numerous objections to the legislative veto. 147 Expanding
his criticisms beyond textual, structural, and historical grounds, he
discussed the practical effects of continuing to allow this congres-
sional power to exist. He also observed that strict separation of pow-
ers fulfilled James Madison's political goal of diffusing power to
prevent tyranny. Although Chief Justice Burger did not precisely
adopt Scalia's reasoning when striking down a House veto of the
Attorney General's decision not to deport an alien, Burger wrote a
broadly reasoned opinion, threatening all legislative vetoes as "legisla-
tion" that has not met the presentment clause requirement.
1 41
143. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justices Black and Douglas held the President had no implied
powers. Id.
144. Justice Jackson agreed that presidential power ebbed to the degree that it conflicted
with congressional power. His conclusion is far different in tone than Scalia's analysis: "I
cannot be brought to believe that this country will suffer if the Court refuses further to
aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent and so relatively immune from judicial
review, at the expense of Congress." Id. at 654. Justice Frankfurter expressed similar
reservations in his separate concurrence. Id. at 593; see Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A
Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953); Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case:
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 141 (1952).
145. Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department of Navy, 783 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
146. The tenth amendment's potential protection of the States' autonomy presents another
interesting constitutional issue where the conservatives sometimes have not been extremely
deferential to Congress. Scalia dissented from an opinion holding that the federal government
had preempted state regulation of intrastate railroads in Illinois Commerce Comm'n v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n. 749 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1984). He did not discuss, however,
much less dispute, the majority's rejection of the state's arguments that Congress did not have
such power under the commerce clause and that Congress was barred by the tenth
amendment. Id. at 886. Scalia based his dissent upon statutory construction, arguing that the
majority read a compromise out of the statute. Id. at 892 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, 3 REG. 19 (Nov.-
Dec. 1979).
148. Immigration Natur'n Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Scalia had an opportunity to put his separation of powers beliefs
into action in Synar v. United States 14 9 when he sat on the three-judge
district court that found the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (designed
to balance the budget) to be unconstitutional. Scalia is rumored to
have written most, if not all, of the unsigned, per curiam decision, 50
and I am therefore going to analyze the decision as if he wrote it. As
in Scalia's law review article on the legislative veto,' the Synar court
used virtually every existing interpretive technique to reject the law
which gave continuing authority to the Comptroller General.
The three-judge district court first found that both the congres-
sional plaintiffs and an organization representing active and retired
federal employees had standing under the "minimum" tests of (1) an
actual or threatened injury, (2) traceable to the defendant, and (3)
amenable to judicial remedy. 5 2 It reasoned that because the Act
allowed the Executive "effectively to nullify" prior congressional
votes by diminishing appropriations through automatic budget cuts,
the congressional members had standing. They were not asserting
such generalized grievances as the Court held to be insufficient in
United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan.'53
After citing the "deferential post-Schechter cases"' 54 which the
Supreme Court decided, the court dismissed plaintiffs' argument that
the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of power. 5 The court
rejected plaintiffs' argument that Congress had improperly delegated
a "core function" because such an analysis would be "effectively
standardless,"' 5 6 leaving its application to the "court's own percep-
tions." '57 The delegation was not excessively broad because Congress
had included very precise standards for the application of the
statute. 118
The Synar court, however, agreed with the plaintiffs that Con-
gress could not allow the Comptroller General, a presidentially
appointed officer who can be removed not just by impeachment but
149. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181
(1986).
150. Lewis, The Court: Scalia, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1986, at 23, col. 1.
151. Scalia, supra note 147, at 19.
152. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1380.
153. Id. at 1382 (distinguishing United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
154. Id. at 1384.
155. Id. at 1391.
156. Id. at 1385.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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also by joint resolution of Congress, to supervise the process.1 5' The
case was ripe because the possibility existed that the Comptroller
would improperly try to please Congress while also serving in the
executive branch.16° To support this conclusion on the merits, the
district court utilized virtually every form of constitutional argument.
After all, as Judge Scalia had once written in a law review article, the
entire theory of separation of powers can only be implied from the
text of the Constitution.1 6 1 The court relied upon the text to discuss
how the appointments clause determined who had removal power.
The court turned to history, including the actions of the First Con-
gress, to determine the purpose of the text. 162 The three judges thor-
oughly discussed Supreme Court precedent to reach the conclusion
that the peculiar status of the Comptroller General placed that
bureaucrat in a "no-man's land"' 63 neither clearly an executive officer
nor clearly outside the executive department.
The court held that those bureaucrats living in "no-man's land"
were congressional officers who could not administer executive pro-
grams.1 64 Drawing such a bright line served several purposes. It was
judicially manageable, unlike the tests the defendants proposed.
Courts would have difficulty determining if the appointment was an
"adequate admixture," or if nonexecutive powers were
"predominate."'' 65 The court cited Montesquieu and Madison to sup-
port its political theory that separation of powers is essential to com-
bat tyranny. 166 The three judges tried to predict the practical
consequences of upholding the Act, and thereby favoring Congress:
Moreover, insofar as effect upon balance of power is concerned,
congressional power to remove is much more potent [than the
Presidential power to remove], since the Executive has no means of
retaliation that may dissuade Congress from exercising it--other
than leaving the office vacant, thereby impairing the Executive's
own functions.' 67
The court concluded its opinion by citing Professor Krattenmaker's
159. Id. at 1403.
160. Id. at 1392.
161. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983).
162. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1395.
163. Id. at 1399. The court noted that the Supreme Court left this no-man's land for future
consideration. Id. (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
164. Id. at 1404.
165. Id. at 1401.
166. Id. at 1401-02.
167. Id. at 1402.
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recent article, which supported drawing bright lines in separation of
powers cases:
The United States has chosen, by the device of a written con-
stitution, and on the basis of specific historical experience, to
resolve that question at one time and in one way for almost all
cases. To respect that judgment promotes stability, predictability
and consistency, and avoids constant reexamination of trouble-
some policy issues underlying the question.'6 '
The main purpose in presenting and discussing this opinion,
which reaches a result I agree with, is to reveal how its author[s] used
virtually every form of constitutional argument to reinforce the deci-
sion. This opinion even included an example of the "changed circum-
stances" argument, a maneuver Judge Scalia had previously criticized
in Olman. Judicial recognition of this development could radically
change the administrative law of "independent" agencies:
Justice Sutherland's decision ... is stamped with some of the polit-
ical science preconceptions characteristic of its era and not of the
present day-if not stamped as well, as President Roosevelt
thought, with hostility toward the architect of the New Deal. It is
not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930's that there can be
such things as genuinely "independent" regulatory agencies, bodies
of impartial experts whose independence from the President does
not entail correspondingly greater dependence upon the commit-
tees of Congress to which they are then immediately accountable;
or, indeed, that the decisions of such agencies so clearly involve
scientific judgment rather than political choice that it is even theo-
retically desirable to insulate them from the democratic process. 169
This dicta, which could lead to a constitutional transformation of
many crucial agencies-particularly the Federal Reserve Board-
appears to be an "application" of "new principles" to "new phenom-
ena." Once again we see the price of arguing that certain modes of
argument are not "legitimate" constitutional arguments. Eventually,
judges use virtually every type of argument. Of course, once most
forms of argument are no longer considered "illegitimate," then most
decisions, including many these conservative judges disapprove of, are
also no longer automatically "illegitimate" because the opinions
rested upon allegedly improper interpretive techniques. They can
only be "illegitimate" because they reached the wrong result. This
brings us back to the realm of political jurisprudence-where we have
been during the entire "legitimacy" debate.
168. Id. at 1404 (quoting Krattenmaker, Article I and Judicial Independence.- Why the
New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297, 301-302, 311 (1981)).
169. Id. at 1398.
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IV. BORK
A. Access to Courts
In eleven civil cases raising constitutional court access issues,
Judge Bork ruled against the plaintiffs ten times. 17° Bork, like Scalia,
implements much of his conservative jurisprudence by ruling in favor
of the government on procedural grounds, rather than fully discussing
the merits.
Unlike Judge Scalia, however, Judge Bork no longer agrees that
congressional members have any special standing status under the
"equitable discretion" doctrine. When he first considered the doc-
trine in Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,17 1 Bork did not completely repudiate
the doctrine in his concurrence to a decision that denied a suit
brought by Republican House leaders who disputed rule changes the
Democratic Speaker of the House had made. Bork applied an overtly
substantive standard to deny the plaintiffs standing: "[I]njury in fact,
far from being a simple, descriptive term is a concept freighted with
policies that limit the kinds of injury courts may consider."'' 72 Bork
explained that those policies were his constitutional beliefs in legiti-
macy and democracy: "Courts may take cognizance only of injuries
of certain types, and the limitations are often defined less by the real-
ity of the litigant's 'adverseness' than by the courts' view of the legiti-
mate boundaries of their own power."1 73 Bork admitted that the line
was hard to draw, but stated that the line should be based upon "more
than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about
the constitutional and prudential limits to the power of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government."1 74
170. Throughout this article, some cases will not be discussed in the main text, but will be
mentioned in the footnotes. For example, I will not analyze Morris v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (eleventh amendment sovereign immunity)
(Scalia joining); Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)
(sovereign immunity); or Grano v. Barry, 733 F.2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (mootness). Bork did
hold that sovereign immunity did not bar a plea for injunctive relief in Dronenburg v. Zech.
741 F.2d 1388, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
171. 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
172. Id. at 1177. In a case denying plaintiffs standing when they challenged an interpretive
regulation that protected their employers from enhancing pensions of those who worked past
the age of sixty-five, Bork made a similar observation about the relationship of the merits to
the scope of standing: "[S]ome inquiry into the merits is necessary in a variety of situations
presenting justiciability questions-those involving, for example, the 'zone of interests' test for
standing." Von Aulock v. Smith, 720 F.2d 176, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
He also denied standing to plaintiffs who requested a special prosecutor be appointed:
"[T]he principle of Executive control extends to all phases of the prosecutorial process."
Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
173. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1177.
174. Id. at 1179. Later in 1983, Bork argued in a concurrence that the majority should
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Two years later, Judge Bork dissented in Barnes v. Kline 175 from
a decision upholding a congressional challenge to a pocket veto made
during a nine week intersession adjournment, even though Congress
had authorized an agent to receive notice of the pocket veto. Bork
returned to his favorite jurisprudential themes to explain his total
rejection of the "equitable discretion" doctrine. The judiciary was
gaining power at the expense of the legislature: "Every time a court
expands the definition of standing, the definition of interests it is will-
ing to protect through adjudication, the area of judicial dominance
grows and the area of democratic rule contracts."' 76 Bork criticized
the equitable discretion doctrine because it had no limits, 77 it gave
special rights to congressional leaders, 178 and it could make the judici-
ary supreme in areas where courts are incompetent to make difficult
decisions. 179
My prior article on these five judges concluded that they may
have been attracted to the concept of legitimacy because it would
allow them to overrule Supreme Court precedent. 8 ° They could
argue that they were not imposing their old judicial ideology; they
were only purging the system of illegitimate decisions. Bork made
that tactical move all but explicit in Barnes: "Though we are obli-
gated to comply with Supreme Court precedent, the ultimate source of
constitutional legitimacy is compliance with the intentions of those
who framed and ratified our Constitution."' 8 ' Precedent is thus a far
have used the standing doctrine instead of the "equitable discretion" or the "political
question" doctrines to deny a congressional challenge to the President's sending troops to El
Salvador. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring).
Bork also avoided using the totally preclusive political question doctrine while concurring
with a decision holding that the Israelis could not sue the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) for slaughtering civilians in Israel: "By deciding that there is no private cause of action
here we do not reach substantive issues that are best decided by the political branches." Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
Bork refused to apply or create federal common law, partially because of "the PLO's
impingement upon American foreign relations." Id. at 808.
Bork did toy with the political question doctrine when he concurred with a decision
upholding the closing of shelters for homeless men without full due process procedures. Such
an action was an unreviewable "political decision," similar to "political questions." Williams
v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring).
175. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 44. Bork cited Judge Scalia's article on standing to support his substantive
conception. Id. at 52 (citing Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983)).
177. Id. at 61.
178. Id. at 68-69.
179. Id. at 58 (Bork cited Hamilton's discussion about the comparative impotence of the
judiciary. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).).
180. Wilson, supra note 2, at 913.
181. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 56 (emphasis added).
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less "legitimate" source of constitutional law: "Constitutional doc-
trine should continually be checked not just against words in prior
opinions but against basic constitutional philosophy."' 182 But Bork
still hedged. After citing Alexander Bickel on the virtues of judicial
delay, Bork turned Burkean: "No good society can be unprincipled;
and no viable society can be principle-ridden."' 3
How can Bork reconcile this desirable Burkean flexibility with
such rigid tests as "legitimate" and "ultimate source"? Readers shall
see that Bork is sometimes flexible (making libel more difficult to
prove for certain plaintiffs),"8 4 sometimes inflexible in the face of pre-
cedent he disputes (not extending rights to homosexuality), 8 5 and
sometimes deferential to precedent he does not like (requiring rein-
statement of employees after dismissals that violate the first amend-
ment).18 6 While Bork's decisions may or may not be wrong, they are
not easily explained merely by "legitimacy" and/or by the "ultimate
source," the Framers' intentions.
B. First Amendment
This article has already discussed Judge Bork's opinion
expanding libel protection to the media in Ollman v. Evans."8 7 For
some reason, Bork did not restate in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Ander-
son 188 the theory he presented in Ollman that libel plaintiffs who
entered the fray have a higher burden of proof, even though those two
similar cases were decided within weeks of each other. I also noted his
concurrences with Judge Scalia's narrow interpretations of the first
amendment in United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan,"9 Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 9 ' and Block v. Meese. 9
From a contemporary liberal perspective, the most reassuring
Bork opinion, which Judge Scalia joined, was his decision in Lebron v.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. 9 2  The court
ordered a public transit authority to display a poster that superim-
posed the face of President Reagan on a figure who was mocking poor
people. The opinion had ironic overtones because Bork had once
182. Id. at 67.
183. Id. at 55.
184. See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 239-49 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
188. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
189. 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see supra note 50.
190. 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see supra note 109.
191. 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see supra note 100.
192. 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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written that art was not protected by the first amendment, a position
he later recanted in print after Jamie Kalven lambasted it.'93 Bork
first implied that because the transit authority had accepted other
political and public interest posters, it had converted itself into a pub-
lic forum.194 The poster was "plainly political."' 9 He refused to
defer to the authority's argument that it was acting on the allegedly
neutral grounds of preventing deception. First, this satirical poster
was not deceptive: "No reasonable person could think this a photo-
graph of an actual meeting." 196 Second, government agencies are dis-
qualified from making judgments about deception when evaluating
political speech: "Since [the transit authority] is judging the truth of a
political statement, to accept its argument is to destroy the distinction
between content-neutral and content-based regulations."'' 97 Further-
more, the ban was an unconstitutional prior restraint. I98 Bork paid
homage to first amendment advocate Harry Kalven, Sr.: "To assess
speech in a public forum some balancing may be necessary, but the
'thumb of the [c]ourt [should] be on the speech side of the scales.' "199
In Reuber v. United States,2" Bork concurred with a decision
permitting a research scientist to sue the United States government
because the scientist resigned after his company, which contracted
with the United States government, had distributed a hostile repri-
mand letter. The scientist had previously criticized the company's
business practices. Bork easily found state action: "[A] private person
whose conduct is allegedly instigated and directed by federal officers
should be treated as a federal agent.""'' Bork agreed that the plaintiff
was entitled to damages and reinstatement, but expressed disappoint-
ment with the Supreme Court's prior cases authorizing the latter rem-
edy: "But for that precedent, the analysis set out above might
persuade me that no action for reinstatement would lie." '202
Bork's dissent in Abourezk v. Reagan 203 reveals some of the lim-
its to his first amendment jurisprudence. The majority held that the
district court needed to restudy the Secretary of State's denial of non-
immigrant visas to aliens who wish to visit this country to give
193. Kalven, Round Two for Judge Bork, 238 NATION 731 (1984).
194. Lebron, 749 F.2d at 894.
195. Id. at 895.
196. Id. at 897.
197. Id. at 899.
198. Id. at 898.
199. Id. at 897.
200. 750 F.2d 1039, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1068.
203. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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speeches in response to requests by United States citizens. The court
remanded the case to the trial court for it to determine if the Secretary
had statutory authority to deny entry merely because entry or pres-
ence is "prejudicial activity" or if the Secretary also had to prove that
the aliens would "engage" in prejudicial "activities" beyond mere
arrival. The court wanted more proof concerning whether Congress
acquiesced in the Secretary's strict reading of the statute,2° and
whether the Secretary had administered the statute consistently.2 °5
The majority also held that the Secretary may have violated the
McGovern Amendment, which states that the Secretary can prevent a
member of a proscribed organization from entering only if the Secre-
tary can prove that the applicant threatens national security for a rea-
son independent of membership in a proscribed group.2 °6
Bork's dissent revolved around a familiar theme: deference to
the Executive's handling of foreign affairs and its interpretation of
statutes. 2 7 He found that legislative history supported his construc-
tion that entry by itself can be an activity prejudicial to the public
interest. He conceded that the text supported the majority; but the
text dropped in significance: "[L]iteralness may strangle meaning. '20 8
Bork stated that the court did not need to remand the case to the trial
court because it was unlikely that any new evidence would be
found.20 9
Bork limited the effect of the McGovern Amendment by stating
that the Secretary barred these aliens in part because they were affili-
ated with hostile governments, not merely because they were mem-
bers of proscribed parties. 210 Furthermore, the Attorney General
could deny visa requests because he was not affected by the McGov-
ern Amendment.1
Turning to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, Bork held that
the power to exclude aliens is "largely immune from judicial con-
trol."'2 12 Under the ruling in Kleindienst v. Mandel,2 1 3 the Executive
may base its decision to exclude an alien upon the content of his
204. Id. at 1055.
205. Id. at 1056.
206. Id. at 1058 & n.20.
207. Id. at 1063 (Bork, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1066 (quoting Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962)).
209. Id. at 1068. Note, however, that Bork eagerly remanded a case to look for unknown
law when he was uncomfortable with the merits in Planned Parenthood v. Heckler. 712 F.2d
650 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
210. Id. at 1069-70.
211. Id. at 1073.
212. Id. at 1075.
213. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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beliefs. Furthermore, Bork suggested that these aliens were not being
excluded because of their ideas;214 they were barred because of their
relationships with certain foreign governments.215 If the Executive
can prevent United States citizens from visiting certain countries
under Zemel v. Rusk,2 16 it can also stop aliens from visiting the
United States.217
Bork concluded his attack on the majority by noting it had begun
''a process of judicial incursion into the United States' conduct of its
foreign affairs. '218  Bork's unwillingness to combine statutory and
first amendment analysis to constrain the Executive may be consistent
with existing Supreme Court precedent, particularly Regan v.
Wald,2 19 which upheld travel restrictions to Cuba. But his deferential
approach to the Executive is far removed from the approach of the
Court in Kent v. Dulles,22 ° which strictly read congressional delega-
tions of passport powers in light of the first amendment.
C. Due Process
Unlike Judge Scalia, his colleague on the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Bork has had several opportunities to write major opinions concern-
ing both procedural and substantive due process. He has favored the
plaintiffs in four out of the nine cases.
1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Several plaintiffs failed to convince Bork that the state deprived
them of constitutionally protected property or liberty. A municipal
employee had no liberty interest to contest a lateral transfer and his
employer's public criticism of his performance. 22' Bork concluded
that a party must lose a job or contractual rights, not just opportuni-
ties for advancement. 222 Nor was public criticism actionable under
the due process clause: "[T]he [Supreme] Court held that defamation
is not enough to give rise to a due process right; 'other governmental
action' is required. '223
Bork twice ruled against plaintiffs representing the homeless.
214. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1075 (Bork, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
217. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1075.
218. Id. at 1076.
219. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
220. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
221. Mosrie v. Barry, 718 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
222. Id. Bork concurred with an opinion upholding a plaintiff's due process challenge to a
constructive discharge. Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
223. Mosrie, 718 F.2d at 1158 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
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Homeless men had no due process right to challenge a "legislative"
decision to close their shelters because the shelters were not their
property.224 Bork did not end his inquiry with the relatively noncon-
troversial position that individuals have no right to full hearings over
legislative issues, such as whether to close group homes. He also
argued that the case was immune from review because it was a "polit-
ical decision," similar to a "political question. ' 225 Bork found this
new defense in the classic case Marbury v. Madison,2 26 in which Chief
Justice Marshall found a cause of action against the President because
Marbury had a vested interest in the employment he had been offered.
In the course of that multifaceted opinion, Marshall observed that the
Supreme Court should not become involved in such "political" issues
as foreign affairs. Bork expanded that classic limitation on judicial
review: "There being no substantive constraints on the decision
whether to close the shelters, that decision is a wholly political one
and under no circumstances that I can imagine can there be a consti-
tutional right to have that political judgment set about and circum-
scribed by procedural requirements. ' 227 Bork varied that theme when
he held that plaintiffs could not challenge a refusal to build a "model
shelter" for the homeless because the plaintiffs did not allege any stat-
utory violations; there was neither law to apply under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, nor were there any "judicially manageable
standards. '"228
2. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS/"TAKING"
Bork has been sympathetic to plaintiffs who have alleged uncon-
stitutional takings as well as procedural violations. Bork agreed with
landlords who disputed "emergency" acts committed by officers of
the District of Columbia that prevented them from converting their
apartments to condominiums.229 Brushing aside such procedural
defenses as exhaustion, abstention, and jurisdiction, Bork observed
that there may have been an unconstitutional "taking" without just
compensation-because the analysis of this issue requires factual
inquiry. 23° That ambiguous observation is troubling because the
Supreme Court's traditional distinction in "taking" cases has been
224. Williams v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 793.
226. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
227. Williams, 708 F.2d at 793.
228. Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 58 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., concurring and
dissenting).
229. Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
230. Id. at 1126.
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between "regulation" and "taking. '231 The District of Columbia
neither physically invaded nor totally devalued the landlords' prop-
erty; it engaged in ad hoc zoning. To characterize such regulations as
"fact specific" only blurs the already unclear, but essential distinction
between "regulation" and "taking." Under Bork's theory, every pol-
lution enforcement case might be a "taking" because it involves spe-
cific facts.
Bork's expansion of the taking doctrine favors the wealthy. The
government is less able to reallocate property interests without com-
pensating those who currently have most of such interests. Bork even
made a positive cryptic reference to substantive economic due process
for the rich, claiming that a "private delegation" issue may be viable
because the Supreme Court has never explicitly repudiated the Loch-
ner-type cases upholding economic due process. 232
After initially denying a utility company's challenge to the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) denial of rate
increases based upon cancelled projects, Bork reconsidered the case
and held that the utility had asserted valid taking and due process
arguments.233 He would not follow the normal path of judicial defer-
ence because the plaintiff had alleged that it was being given no rate of
return. 234 Brushing off the dissent's "ultimate malediction" that he
was reviving Lochner,21' Bork creatively applied taking and due pro-
cess doctrine:
It should be noted that the Hope Natural Gas end result test
secures Jersey Central's constitutional right that its property not be
taken without just compensation. Thus, the utility has raised a
constitutional as well as a statutory claim in this case .... Before
an alleged taking may occur, it seems likely that FERC should
have conducted a due process hearing to determine the merits of
the utility's case. Thus, even aside from Jersey Central's statutory
right to a hearing, the utility might well have a valid constitutional
due process claim. 236
The prior commentary cannot be easily reconciled with Bork's
homeless cases. The FERC was implementing a general policy of not
letting utilities include all projects in their rate base; that decision was
"legislative" because it was broad-based and future-oriented.
231. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
232. Id.
233. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 730 F.2d 816
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 768 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
234. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 768 F.2d
1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
235. Id. at 1504 (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
236. Id. at 1505 n.7.
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Although one should never assume too much from a limited set of
cases, one can see how the taking doctrine can be used by conservative
judicial activists to favor the wealthy.237 We saw another example of
possible class bias when Judge Scalia held that milk consumers had no
standing to challenge the government, but stockbrokers did.238
These cases may not signify the resurrection of Lochner and the
constitutional ranking of property rights above civil rights. Certainly
it is easier to find a property interest in money or real property than in
a job transfer or in a rejected promise to build a shelter. Bork may be
only toying with Lochner, labelling it an "ultimate malediction" in
one case, claiming it is not dead in another. But as we shall later see,
Judge Posner is clearly interested in reviving a limited version of eco-
nomic due process.
3. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Dronenburg v. Zech 2 39 probably generated the most media atten-
tion of any case these five men decided. In Dronenburg, Judge Bork
validated the Navy's power to discharge homosexuals.24 After rely-
ing upon the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of a lower court
rejection of a challenge to a law outlawing sodomy,24 ' Bork again
applied his constitutional jurisprudence. Calling upon a concept he
initially proposed in a law review article,242 Bork argued that lower
federal courts should not expand any of the Supreme Court's "new
rights. '243 "New rights" are those not clearly within the penumbras
of existing textual rights.2" They are rights that have no "explana-
tory principle," and thus the lower courts can only stare at the
Supreme Court opinions, which provide no general direction. 245 Bork
limited the sources of "existing textual rights," which can only be
"suggest[ed] [by] the contours of a value already stated in the docu-
237. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 345-46 (1985).
238. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
239. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court has recently held that states may
outlaw homosexual sodomy. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 284 (1986).
240. Id.
241. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
242. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. In a footnote, Bork discussed the relevance
of his prior criticisms of Supreme Court decisions to his role as a jurist. He conceded that the
Court had created "new rights" when he would not have done so. He also noted that the
lower courts have a duty to follow those decisions and their "methodology." Dronenburg, 741
F.2d at 1396 n.5. Following the methodology, however, does not necessitate expanding any
principles that might be found under the cases. Indeed, lower courts should not go beyond the
narrow holdings of such cases. Id.
243. Id. at 1396.
244. Id. at 1392.
245. Id. at 1395.
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ment or implied by the Constitution's structure and history. "246
Supreme Court precedent is of less weight. Therefore, Bork wrote that
the Griswold Court found a "new right" when it struck down a state
law regulating contraceptives. The Eisenstadt decision to give unmar-
ried citizens the right to contraceptives did not imply a general right
to sexual freedom because Eisenstadt involved a different type of "per-
sonal decision."' 24 ' Bork once again revived the concept of legitimacy,
citing Judge White's dissent from an opinion striking down narrowly
defined family zoning ordinances in which White made the argument
that such substantive due process decisions come "nearest to
illegitimacy. 2 4
Premised upon his majoritarian assumption that legislative
choices are not presumptively invalid,24 9 Bork has created a novel
methodology of constitutional interpretations for lower courts, a
hierarchy the Supreme Court itself has never expressed. Lower court
judges can expand doctrine when they believe the Supreme Court has
properly construed an "existing textual right." Bork would claim he
did just that in his concurrence in Olman v. Evans25° when he sug-
gested that the court increase the burden on libel plaintiffs who are
politically active. Lower courts should narrowly read all holdings of
Supreme Court opinions creating "new rights." The line between
these two groups of rights will be unclear. For instance, Bork agreed
with the voiding of antimiscegenation laws because such racist laws
violate the purpose of the fourteenth amendment.2  Was that deci-
sion a family decision, a sexual autonomy decision, a racial decision,
or all three? Would Bork disagree with the Supreme Court's decision
that common criminals should not be sterilized? 25 2  Would he
approve a statute that allowed a state to sterilize all welfare recipients
if they wanted to continue to receive benefits? Sexuality and family
autonomy, as well as the eighth and fourteenth amendments, are
themes in such cases. After all, sterilization is cruel because of its
sexual impact. Unless all of these decisions are illegitimate, one has to
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1396 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting)). White's dissent is the only time a Supreme Court Justice mentioned legitimacy as
a constitutional test. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 112-13 (1983).
249. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397.
250. 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
251. Dronenberg, 741 F.2d at 1393 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
252. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Skinner was decided on equal protection
grounds. Id. at 538.
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make difficult judgments as to how far a court should go. Labelling
cases you don't like "illegitimate" only clouds that inquiry.
Even assuming that Bork's distinction makes sense, where did he
find authority for this theory of lower court jurisprudence? Certainly
neither constitutional history nor text mandate it. If he turns to
"structure," he is relying upon a vague concept. In my previous arti-
cle about these judges, I suggested that the underlying structural
theme of the Constitution was and ought to be to combat tyranny.153
Although we may disagree over when a government has acted tyran-
nically, at least everyone will know what we are debating about and
why. And even if "tyranny" were to be narrowly defined, such a stan-
dard would provide more constitutional protection and direction than
solely relying upon the uncertain distinction between "existing textual
rights" and "new rights," an esoteric, legalistic distinction which
judges can easily manipulate to fit their own political preconceptions
while appearing to remain "neutral."
Bork continued to define family rights narrowly in Franz v.
United States,254 when he denied a noncustodial parent the right to a
hearing to determine if he could visit his children, who were part of
the Witness Protection Program. Bork first argued that family law
should primarily be state law: "It will not do to shrug off the most
fundamental precepts of federalism so casually. ' 255 Turning to sub-
stantive due process family rights, Bork expressed his regrets: "It is
not to be doubted by an inferior court that substantive due process is
part of our constitutional law. The Supreme Court has made it so,
and that must be enough for us."'256 Once again, Bork stated that
lower courts should not go further and create "a new substantive
right to visit [one's] children. ' 257 Although Bork thought that such
visitation might be good policy, he concluded a federal court would be
erring by acting aggressively in an area without the guidance of text
or structure. 258 He observed that federal courts might become entan-
gled in all custody cases. He preferred to defer to congressional
assessments of how to best protect witnesses. 259 He then climbed
down from his world of constitutional distinctions to note that the
majority's superimposed procedures did not adequately serve any of
253. See Wilson, supra note 2, at 916-17 & n.4.
254. 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring and dissenting).
255. Id. at 1436.
256. Id. at 1438.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1437, 1440.
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the parties; he feared that many people might unnecessarily die.2 61
In Franz, Bork shed more light on his definition of the "history"
of "existing textual rights." According to him, such rights have to
have existed for an awfully long time: "Courts have enough trouble
identifying and deriving specific meaning from traditions that are real
and have been with us for centuries past without imagining traditions
that have yet to exist."' 261 But Bork then ended his opinion with a
surprising maneuver, one granting the plaintiffs limited relief:
If the new substantive constitutional right had not been con-
structed, [the plaintiff] would still have had a liberty interest
requiring due process, a right which, if he had no state or federal
substantive right, would have been vindicated by a process
designed to determine whether the Attorney General, through his
delegate, had acted within the ambit of authority granted by
Congress.262
This mysterious passage raises several questions. Why is the "liberty
interest" not a "new right"? What procedure does the plaintiff
receive-a right to an individual hearing or a right to a court hearing
to determine if the statute was properly construed?
Judge Bork has become somewhat entangled in these dualistic
distinctions that either accept or reject decisions and/or modes of
argument based upon their "legitimacy." Recall that he altered
underlying libel law to increase media protection in Olman v. Evans.
He justified a higher standard for politically active plaintiffs because
the existing law was not working,263 juries were unreliable in such
cases, 264 and "unchanging values find their application" in a changing
world.2 65 Bork explained that his new doctrine-which, of course,
could be called a "new right" for the media-was consistent with
existing Supreme Court precedent. He observed that if courts cannot
override legislatures when times have changed, the malice standard in
New York Times v. Sullivan 266 would be "illegitimate. '267 Bork has
not provided any clear guideline between what is an illegitimate "new
right" and what is a legitimate application of a "known principle":
"When there is a known principle to be explicated the evolution of
doctrine is inevitable. ' 26  His test becomes particularly murky
260. Id. at 1442-43.
261. Id. at 1439 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 1443.
263. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 995, 998.
265. Id. at 995.
266. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
267. Olman, 750 F.2d at 996.
268. Id. at 995.
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because of Dronenburg v. Zech, in which Bork held that because no
"explanatory principle" existed, the lower court had a duty not to
expand any previously articulated rights beyond what the Supreme
Court had already articulated. 269 Actually, prior privacy cases offered
several "explanatory principles," ranging from sexual autonomy to
family autonomy, just as prior libel/first amendment doctrine did not
speak with perfect clarity. Additionally, several Justices used the
"changed times" argument to justify their conclusion that anticon-
traceptive laws were unconstitutional.
Constitutional analysis is neither clarified nor simplified by run-
ning all cases through a legitimacy test that tries to eliminate certain
decisions and certain forms of argument as improper through some
allegedly "neutral," determinate analysis. Furthermore, it is always
risky for a judge or a lawyer to totally exclude one commonly used
form of argument as illegitimate, because over the course of a career
that person will almost invariably use virtually all forms of argument
in different cases to best express how and why different cases should
be resolved in a certain way. Lawyers and judges invariably use the
"changed times" argument. Indeed, both Bork and Scalia used it in
Ollman to reach opposite conclusions. That is, however, the real
point of the changed times argument-courts should and do respond
to new circumstances. The difficult problem is to determine when
times have changed, how times have changed, and what the court
should do, if anything. 270
D. Equal Protection
Bork was equally unreceptive to the equal protection argument
of the homosexual serviceman who sued to overturn his discharge
269. 741 F.2d at 1395-97.
270. In one case involving sexual and family relations, Planned Parenthood Fed. of
America v. Heckler, Bork was not very deferential to Congress. 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.
1983). Although the case was resolved on statutory grounds, it is noteworthy because it
demonstrates the malleability of the deference argument. Plaintiffs challenged a federal
regulation that required all family planning centers to give notice to parents that their
teenagers sought contraceptives. The majority struck down the regulation because federal law
stated that all persons shall receive such services and because it was contrary to legislative
history. Id. at 652. Bork agreed that the section the majority relied upon did not allow such
regulations, but he concluded that Congress did not clearly prohibit such regulations. Id. at
667. Although Bork conceded that the Executive had misinterpreted the relevant law, he
stated that they might have such authority somewhere else. Id. at 665. Thus, Bork suggested
that the case be remanded to search for this unknown law and to force Congress to make up its
mind, even though he agreed that the statute did not allow the disputed executive action. As
the majority observed, such a remand would be totally gratuitous because the Executive had
obviously violated the law. Id. at 665 n.*.
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from the Navy in Dronenburg v. Zech.2 7 1 Applying the deferential
"rational purpose" test, Bork held that the Navy's policy was based
upon implementing morality, a permissible goal. 2 72 The Navy also
was concerned about maintaining discipline and morale; it did not
want to worry about troops trying to seduce each other. Bork stated
that the Navy did not need statistical proof to verify these fears,
"common sense" was sufficient. 273 He concluded with the familiar
theme of enhanced judicial deference to the military, a unique
institution.274
Bork also dismissed an equal protection challenge to unequal
parole treatment of District of Columbia residents who were prison-
ers in District of Columbia prisons instead of being imprisoned in reg-
ular federal prisons.27 5 Once again he applied the rationality test,
noting that tradition by itself is a defense. 276 He also deferred to the
prison system: "Uniformity of parole standards within a prison might
well be adopted as an important tool of prison management. '277
E. Government Structure
Bork has twice expressed some homage to state powers. In the
course of dismissing for mootness a suit seeking enforcement of a state
initiative, Bork observed: "It is one thing for the federal Constitution
to guarantee a right of access to a state electoral process that has been
restricted by state law. It is quite another to assert that the federal
Constitution guarantees that state officials will act in conformity with
state law."'2 78 Recall that Bork also did not want to interfere with the
federal Witness Protection Program because federal courts would be
invading the state arena of child custody: "It will not do to shrug off
the most fundamental precepts of federalism so casually. '279
V. POSNER
Posner's judicial opinions frequently have not been as "conserva-
tive" as those of Bork or Scalia. Posner's commitment to the applica-
271. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
272. Id. at 1398.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Cosgrove v. Smith, 697 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring and
dissenting).
276. Id. at 1144.
277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. Grano v. Barry, 733 F.2d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Bork observed that state courts
should first resolve state claims so that federal courts would not be flooded. Id. at 169.
279. Franz v. United States, 712 F.2d 1428, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring and
dissenting); see supra notes 254-62 and accompanying text.
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tion of free market economics to legal problems reflects libertarian
values, while Bork's and Scalia's traditionalism and deference are
tools of positivism. Furthermore, as Posner's critics have frequently
observed, economic analysis of law generates uncertain results.28 °
People will disagree about the costs, benefits, and externalities of any
decision. Therefore, when Posner uses economic tools to analyze a
case, he may reach a surprisingly "liberal" conclusion.
Unlike Bork or Scalia, Posner has peppered many of his constitu-
tional opinions with economic rhetoric. For example, in the course of
ruling against a mandatory retirement standard he made the some-
what gratuitous observation that: "The usual assumption in econom-
ics as in life is that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar
tomorrow, both because it can be invested and earn interest and
because the future is uncertain. 28 1 At least economics and life are
yet not the same. In addition, Posner is not as deferential to history
as Bork and Scalia claim to be: "Rigidly historicist interpretations of
the Constitution have not been much in vogue for generations. 2
8 2
A. Access to Courts
Judge Posner has been more willing to provide a federal forum to
constitutional claims than Judges Bork or Scalia. In many cases he
did not discuss access issues; but when he did, he often favored the
plaintiff.28
3
1. ABSTENTION/RIPENESS
Posner's opinion in Lynk v. Pearson 28 4 exemplified his willing-
ness to provide a forum to constitutional plaintiffs. Lynk, a prison
inmate, argued that a state court denied him due process and equal
protection when it would not decide his divorce petition. The trial
judge had refused to grant Lynk special permission to attend a
divorce hearing and refused to decide the case solely on public
records, 285 a possibility because Lynk only had to prove under state
law that he had been married and had been convicted of a felony. 286
The state prevailed at the federal district court level by arguing that
280. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984).
281. Heiar v. Crawford County, Wis., 746 F.2d 1190, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 3500 (1985) (emphasis added).
282. Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
283. One might try to explain such doctrinal distinctions by the different facts of the cases.
But that argument destroys all comparisons between judges sitting on different benches.
284. 789 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1986).
285. Id. at 557.
286. Id.
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the Supreme Court decision in Younger v. Harris"" required the fed-
eral court to abstain from hearing the case because the divorce action
was a "pending state proceeding. '288
The state in Lynk did not convince Posner with its argument that
the federal courts would become domestic courts if they intervened in
such cases. Posner noted that the plaintiff was not seeking a divorce
in federal court.289 The inmate was only trying to escape from the
"Catch-22" created by the state court: requiring his attendance at his
divorce hearing, but refusing his request to participate because he was
a prisoner.29 ° Posner also pointed out that the Supreme Court had
evaluated the constitutionality of state divorce procedures when it
struck down filing fees for indigents in Boddie v. Connecticut,29 but
had not entangled the federal courts in domestic conflicts.292 In the
course of making this distinction between reviewing procedures and
reviewing substantive decisions, Posner revealed his limited weighting
of history as a source of constitutional law. Posner explained that
diversity jurisdiction did not cover domestic disputes: "The existence
of the exception rests on dubious historical, but powerful pragmatic
grounds." 293
Judge Posner avoided many opportunities to dismiss the plain-
tiff's claim. According to him, no parallel proceeding existed because
the state court was not active. After all, the prisoner could not obtain
relief in state court. The prisoner did not need to seek an interlocu-
tory appeal partially because such an order had to be signed by the
trial judge, "and the judge was unlikely to do that here. ' 294 Even if
certification were normally the preferred route, it need not be pursued
in this case because the defendants provided no guidance as to how to
certify such a case in their brief to the federal appellate court. The
plaintiff's failure to cite constitutional violations in state court did not
matter because the trial judge used the adjective "fundamental," "the
287. 401 U.S 37 (1971).
288. Lynk, 789 F.2d at 557-58.
289. Id. at 558.
290. Id. at 559.
291. 401 U.S 371 (1971).
292, Lynk, 789 F.2d at 563.
293. Id. at 558. Posner elaborated upon the limits of history in another diversity case: "But
however shoddy the historical underpinnings of the probate exception, it is too well established
a feature of our federal system to be lightly discarded, and by an inferior court at that ...."
Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982). He added that "several practical reasons"
exist to preclude probate cases from federal court: legal certainty, judicial economy, and
federal court experience. Id. at 714-15. He did not add a test he had proposed in his writings;
federal jurisdiction should be granted to those likely to suffer injury via interstate externalities.
R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS (1985).
294. Lynk, 789 F.2d at 561.
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language of constitutional law."' 2 95  Simple involuntary dismissal,
therefore, would leave "a plaintiff whose case has been completely
frustrated by a judicial ruling without appellate recourse. "296 Fur-
thermore, an oral hearing would be unnecessary because the case can
be resolved by a review of public records and/or depositions.
Posner also minimized the relevance of the principle that no fed-
eral constitutional right to appeal exists: "The significance of this
principle in an age when the right of appeal from final judgments is
universal is by no means clear; it seems inconceivable for example that
due process would be interpreted today to allow a state to execute a
criminal defendant without giving him any right to appeal from his
conviction and sentence. ' 297 History once again played a minor role
in his constitutional adjudication.
The judge also rejected the Pullman abstention doctrine, which
requires federal courts to remand cases to state courts to resolve
uncertainties in state law: "Everyone recognizes that abstention
under Pullman is a great time waster. ' 298 Posner applied the ubiqui-
tous cost-benefit analysis in a way that liberals might applaud: "The
waste is justified only when there are large benefits, as when a statute
or ordinance can be saved by a narrowing construction. ' 299 Posner,
because he could not predict how the state courts would handle the
plaintiff's claim, held that "[t]he uncertainty is too great to justify
invoking the Pullman doctrine." 3"
Creative use of the remand power has been one of Posner's judi-
cial trademarks. In Lynk, he ordered the district court to retain juris-
diction and take no further action until the plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed the original divorce suit and refiled his suit in state court,
asserting all state and federal claims.30 The federal courts, therefore,
need not excessively intervene into state proceedings; instead, the
state court had an initial opportunity to eliminate the Catch-22. Pos-
ner concluded by indicating how the state judiciary should decide the
case: "An individual judge has erected seemingly arbitrary proce-
dural obstacles to the adjudication of Lynk's petition for divorce." 0'
In Illinois v. General Electric Co. ,3 Posner considered one of the
295. Id. at 562.
296. Id. at 563.
297. Id. at 565.
298. Id. at 568 (discussing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 569.
302. Id.
303. 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). In Duckworth v.
Franzen, Posner conditioned his remand of a pendent state claim on the defendant's waiving a
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Supreme Court's most famous Catch-22's: the relationship between
Younger abstention and "ripeness." A plaintiff who files in federal
court before the state acts in state court can have his case dismissed as
"unripe," while a plaintiff who files after the state has initiated state
proceedings faces the Younger defense.3" In a case involving a state's
refusal to permit deposit of out-of-state shipments of nuclear fuel into
its storage facility, Posner opposed strict application of the two
defenses: "There must be something wrong with this argument,
because if it were accepted it would prevent people from ever chal-
lenging the constitutionality of state legislation in federal court."3 5
The case was ripe for four reasons: the dispute was not nebulous, the
law was clear, the state would act, and the state would almost cer-
tainly discover violations and enforce the law. °6
Refusing to remand the case to state court just because the state
had filed suit after the plaintiff filed in federal court, Posner explained
that Younger did not apply; the state could not initiate a criminal
proceeding where the plaintiffs had not violated the law.30 7 Further-
more, judicial resources were not being wasted because the state court
had not acted. 3 8 Nevertheless, Posner appeared somewhat uncom-
fortable with his rejection of the ripeness-abstention trap: "But at
another level, if understood to require federal claimants always to liti-
gate their claims as defenses in state court if they can, it must be
wrong. . . . If not wrong, such a reading would still be an inappro-
priate flight of fancy for an inferior federal court to take. '3 0 9 Turning
to the merits, he held that the state law violated both the dormant
commerce clause and the Atomic Energy Act.3 10
Posner again overcame any ambivalence about Younger when he
concluded that a state violated both the commerce clause and the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, § 2, by requiring all
local governments to favor state workers for local construction
projects.3" The community's policy was not as important as the pub-
statute of limitations defense. 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 106 S. Ct.
1085 (1986).
304. See, e.g., Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
305. General Electric, 683 F.2d at 212.
306. Id. at 209-10.
307. Id. at 212.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 211. Later in the opinion, Posner again hedged: "While there are arguments in
favor of [dismissing under Younger], for among other things it is unseemly to allow a single
federal district judge to enjoin a state statute, it would be too radical a break with precedent to
be decreed by a lower court." Id. at 213.
310. Id. at 214-16.
311. W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernadi, 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
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lic policy in criminal proceedings in Younger-type cases: "Thus, both
the nature of the remedy sought by, and more important the underly-
ing right asserted by, the state in its suit make the remedy that these
plaintiffs are seeking less invasive of state sovereignty than in the
usual Younger case. "312 Posner observed that expansion of Younger
would extend Supreme Court jurisdiction.313 Furthermore, forcing
the plaintiffs into state court would be futile because of existing hostile
state court precedent.3 4
The jurist then turned to the merits and once again was not
overly solicitous of states' rights. Although states have the discretion
to help local residents, "in none of the cited cases was the difference
between the state's own purchasing and that of its local governmental
units discussed." '315 Because of this distinction and because the state
failed to provide proof of costs and benefits,316 Posner struck the law
down. Illinois was not entitled to deference; they had to prove that
harm would probably occur "from allowing nonresidents to work on
public construction projects in Illinois. 31 7 Nor did he favor the
states by manipulating the uncertain Supreme Court doctrine defining
the constitutional relationships between state and local governments.
For example, four "liberal" Supreme Court Justices wrote in Milliken
v. Bradley318 that local governments were state actors when determin-
ing the scope of busing as a remedy for de jure segregation, while four
"conservative" Justices decided in Washington v. Seattle School Dist.
No. 1,319 that local governments were the progeny of the state when
reviewing the state's power to rescind a local busing ordinance. In
both Milliken and Washington, the opposing side replied that the state
and local governments were constitutionally distinct. Posner, there-
fore, could have decided that the local government deserves full pro-
tection, protection the Supreme Court might very well have affirmed.
Supreme Court Justices seem to consider the distinction between
state and local governments to be less important than the merits of
any given issue.
Posner's skeptical approach toward abstention reappeared in
Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corp. when he held that
312. Id. at 490.
313. Id. at 491.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 495.
316. Id. at 497.
317. Id. at 496.
318. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (White, Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ.).
319. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). But see Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527
(1982). For a general discussion of constitutional constraints on local government, see D.
GELFAND, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1984).
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Jehovah's Witnesses did not have to first proceed to state court to
clarify a state statute making school attendance mandatory for chil-
dren. 20 He did not defer to the district court's application of the
Pullman doctrine because the case would be delayed and because
neither side requested abstention before the trial. 321 The plaintiffs'
victory was Pyrric; Posner concluded that the law was constitutional
on its face: "At least so far as these plaintiffs are concerned, it is a
valid law-at worst, one applied too harshly to them, to forbid home
instruction that really was the equivalent to instruction in public
schools.
32 2
On the other hand, Posner aggressively employed the Pullman
doctrine to remand to state court a first amendment vagueness chal-
lenge to a loitering statute.3 23 Police had harassed the plaintiff under
the law. The judge conceded that the case was ripe because the police
had threatened to arrest the plaintiff.3 24 He then wrote that the state
courts had never construed the act and that the law could be inter-
preted to protect the plaintiff. In this case, delay was not a major
cost: "[W]e imagine his goals in this litigation are more symbolic
than practical .... 325
Posner was also hostile to the Illinois Attorney General's request
for a declaratory judgment to determine if federal law had preempted
the Illinois Strikebreaker Act.32 6 The Attorney General had filed his
complaint in federal court almost two years before, but had never filed
criminal charges in state court. Because the Attorney General had
failed to invoke his prosecutorial discretion, the case was not ripe.
Furthermore, it may have been resolvable under purely state
grounds.327
2. STANDING
When a group of administrative law judges attacked a new Social
Security instruction which limited their discretion to determine when
to begin recouping improperly paid benefits, Posner held that the
320. Mazanec v. North Judson-San Pierre School Corp., 763 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1985); see
also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986) (discussing municipal liability under
section 1983).
321. Mazanee, 763 F.2d at 846.
322. Id. at 848.
323. Waldron v. McAtee, 723 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1983).
324. Id. at 1353. When dissident nonunion members tried to enforce their right not to
contribute to nonbusiness related issues, Posner ignored a ripeness defense. Hudson v.
Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984).
325. Waldron, 723 F.2d at 1353.
326. Illinois v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 704 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1983).
327. Id. at 941-42.
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judges had no standing.3 21 Invoking economic imagery, he all but
agreed the judges had been injured: "Discretion is a power, a com-
modity that judges, like other people, prize. A reduction in discretion
is a reduction in an important though nonpecuniary form of compen-
sation for a judge. ' 32 9 The recipients, however, not the judges, were
the best parties: "[The judges'] proper course is to obey the instruc-
tion and let any claimant injured by it ask the courts to set it
aside."33 0 Posner's holding was similar to Professor Brilmayer's argu-
ment that standing protects self-representation and due process by
insuring that the best party represents himself or herself.
331
A political organization, because it failed to allege that any of its
members were injured, had no standing to demand that the state
allow registration of voters in public aid and unemployment compen-
sation offices.3 32 Posner distinguished between ideological and per-
sonal injury: "[The injury] must therefore affect one's possessions or
bodily integrity or freedom of action, however expansively defined...
not just one's opinions, aspirations, or ideology. ' 3 3 He reiterated the
argument that parties could only assert their own interests, not the
interest of others.334 But he went far beyond any values contained in
due process and self-representation notions to support his holding.
He warned against zealots and other "self-appointed protectors.
335
He defended his broad definition of standing because it helped fulfill
"the need to limit the amount of litigation. 3 a
36
B. Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court's broad reading of the eleventh amendment
has been another source of consternation for civil rights lawyers. For
example, even though the text only prohibits federal suits against
states by out-of-state citizens, the Court has held that in-state citizens
328. D'amico v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1983).
329. Id. at 905.
330. Id. at 906.
331. Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law Method,
57 B.U.L. REV. 807, 823-26 (1977).
332. People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 171-
72 (7th Cir. 1984).
333. Id. at 171.
334. Id. He did concede that lawyers probably had standing to contest a trial court's
finding that they acted reprehensively even though the court did not enter any sanctions. Bolte
v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984). He dismissed the appeal, however,
because the lawyers should have filed a writ of mandamus instead of filing under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Id.
335. Id. at 173.
336. Id.
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are barred from receiving retroactive damage relief.337 Posner, unlike
his colleague Judge Easterbrook, has not expanded the doctrine.
In Heiar v. Crawford County,3 38 Posner supported the award of
back pay and attorney's fees to policemen who challenged a county
requirement that they retire at age fifty-five. Posner concluded that
their claim was not barred by the eleventh amendment because coun-
ties are not states and because the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, under which the plaintiffs brought suit, was passed
as "an exercise of Congress's powers under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. ' 339 He did not have to adopt either argument.
As discussed above, the constitutional relationship between state and
local governments is extremely unclear, thereby providing jurists with
great discretion when new applications of the distinction arise.
Posner could have easily held that local governments receive full elev-
enth amendment immunity. His second justification is also not totally
conclusive; the Court had already rejected the argument that the
fourteenth amendment completely trumps the eleventh amend-
ment.3 ° Posner was also tough against the states on the merits. Once
again he placed the burden of proof on the government, which had to
show that the plaintiffs were unfit to be policemen. The local authori-
ties could not automatically rely on prior cases upholding similar age
limits for airplane pilots.34 Posner explained that the effects of death
or severe illness will vary if, for instance, the employee is a book-
keeper instead of a pilot.3 42
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Illinois Department of Transpor-
tation, the eleventh amendment did not bar an action seeking to strike
down a state statute setting different liability limits for vehicular than
337. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974).
338. 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3500 (1985).
339. Id. at 1194. The Supreme Court explained the significance of an act that is enacted
pursuant to U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that
authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that
Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose
of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in
other contexts.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
340. "[A]lthough Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have required an
unequivocal expression of congressional intent .... " Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (citation omitted).
341. Heiar, 746 F.2d at 1198.
342. Id.
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for nonvehicular torts.34 3 Posner held that the plaintiffs were primar-
ily seeking injunctive relief to have the differential declared unconsti-
tutional. Any damages that they might have received were incidental
to the equitable relief, and therefore were not barred by the eleventh
amendment. 3 " Once again, we see Posner's willingness to find liabil-
ity; he could have read the prohibition in Edelman v. Jordan
341
against retroactive damages to bar any monetary compensation. Per-
haps he wished to retain monetary damages as a constitutional rem-
edy because damages are the best deterrent to wrong action where no
other market exists.
C. Due Process
Posner's redefinition of procedural due process has emerged as
his most interesting, creative judicial work. He has provided a far
more coherent framework for deciding which interests are constitu-
tionally protected "life, liberty, and property" than has the Supreme
Court. First, he has proposed expanding due process to protect "lib-
erty of occupation,"3 46 which he has also called "liberty of con-
tract. ' 347 Second, he has limited governmental liability by arguing
that the Constitution is a "charter of negative liberties.
3 48
1. "LIFE, LIBERTY & PROPERTY"
After surviving such threshold issues as state action, 34 9 depriva-
tion,350 and personage, a plaintiff must prove that the state has
deprived him or her of constitutionally protected "life, liberty, or
property" which deserves more procedural protection prior to depri-
343. Continental Ins. Co. v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 709 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1983).
344. Id. at 474. Posner's decision came down before the Supreme Court decided Green v.
Mansour, which held that the eleventh amendment barred granting declaratory relief that
would lead to damages. 106 S. Ct. 423 (1985).
345. 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974).
346. See Perry v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 781 F.2d 1294, 1304 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., concurring) (denying relief on the grounds of common law privilege).
347. Vail v. Board of Educ. of Paris Union School Dist. No. 95, 706 F.2d 1435, 1450 (7th
Cir. 1983).
348. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
349. Posner held that a trader who lost a commodity seat had no due process claim because
the Commodity Exchange is a private organization. Consequently, there was no state action.
Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 186 (7th Cir. 1984).
350. Posner has denied constitutional relief under the due process clause to plaintiffs who
brought tort actions against the state because the state actors did not act deliberately and
because the Constitution is a "charter of negative liberties." See supra notes 346-48. One could
make the textual argument that the element of "intent" is a necessary component of
"deprivation" under the due process clause. Even so, the court must still determine what type
of intent generates constitutional liability.
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vation than the state already offers.3 51 The analysis is inevitably com-
plex because, as Posner has observed, the "right-privilege" distinction
has faded away: "No one believes any more that since the captain of a
warship has no duty to let members of the general public on board to
visit the ship when it is docked, he can decide to allow only Protestant
visitors on board. ' 352 Nevertheless, courts must create some distinc-
tion unless all disputes with the state are to be resolved by a formal
hearing.
In a dissent to an opinion holding that a high school football
coach had a right to a hearing when the high school fired him after
the first year of a two-year contract,353 Posner cited James Madison's
Essay on Property to support the proposition that not all contract
rights deserve constitutional protection.354 Posner stated that the
plaintiff could still coach football: "If the State of Illinois forbade Mr.
Vail to work as a football coach it would be interfering with his liberty
of contract."35 The judge distinguished the coach's firing from
Supreme Court precedent giving additional procedural protection to
welfare recipients and tenured teachers:
[S]tatutory entitlements of indefinite duration have enough attrib-
utes of conventional property to be protected by the due process
clause. Sindermann and the welfare cases extend to individuals
who lack substantial assets of a conventional sort the protection of
the due process clause for the unconventional assets they have.3 56
The jurist explained that the courts were particularly anxious to pro-
tect teachers: "The idea that teachers have a special claim to judicial
protection now goes by the name of academic freedom. ' 357 Posner
351. Sometimes due process issues are avoided because the court holds that the plaintiff did
not receive his or her statutory rights. For example, Posner struck down a state law that
delayed the payment of unemployment compensation benefits to people indicted for a felony or
misdemeanor theft in connection with their employment until they are found innocent. Posner
held that such a law violated the federal law requiring that unemployment benefits be paid
"when due." Jenkins v. Bowling, 691 F.2d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1982).
Judge Posner also denied a request for individual hearings to contest a referendum that
sought to prevent the sale of liquor. Not only was such state action specifically protected under
the twenty-first amendment, but it also was legislative, not adjudicative. Philly's v. Byrne, 732
F.2d 87, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1984).
352. Philly's, 732 F.2d at 90.
353. Vail v. Board of Educ. of Paris Union School Dist. No. 95, 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir.
1983), aff'd per curiam, 104 S. Ct. 2144 (1984) (equally divided court).
354. Id. at 1450 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing J. MADISON, Essay on Property, in 6
WRITINGS 101 (Hunt ed. 1906)).
355. Id. Posner also referred to enhanced protection of "liberty of occupation" in Perry v.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 781 F.2d 1294, 1305 (7th Cir. 1986).
356. Vail, 706 F.2d at 1451 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) and Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
357. Id. at 1452.
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therefore openly combined history, precedent, and policy to reformu-
late doctrine: "I plead guilty, though, to Judge Eschbach's charge
that I am 'super-imposing a unifying doctrinal thread onto the cases
which would explain their outcomes in a principled fashion.' I had
understood this to be my job. '3 5 8
By additionally focusing on remedial distinctions, Posner
overjustified his theory:
[A] contract right, as such, is not property. We infer the existence
of a property right from the remedies the law gives to protect it. A
right protected by an injunction, by specific performance, or by
criminal penalties is a property right. But if the only remedy the
law provides is damages, we speak of a liability rule rather than of
a property right.3" 9
This analysis begs numerous questions. For instance, it does not help
us in the immediate case if the football coach sought his job back as a
form of injunctive relief or as specific performance. Nor does it help
us decide if a plaintiff deserves injunctive relief.
Posner may be right to exclude most contract rights from due
process coverage. Otherwise, the state would be entangled with pro-
cess whenever it hired people temporarily or negotiated with the pri-
vate sector. Distinctions between protected and unprotected contract
rights may be partially arbitrary, but that problem does not mean that
such distinctions are either avoidable or undesirable. Posner, for
example, concluded that "[t]he dismissal of a football coach does not
endanger academic freedom. "360 One might disagree with that spe-
cific conclusion, but still accept Posner's basic theory that "liberty of
occupation" should be a constitutionally protected right, while most
other contractual rights may not be protected.
In an opinion denying a plaintiff's request for a hearing after a
city had taken away his license to sell guns because he was a felon
who had previously sold guns to minors, 61 Posner overtly embraced a
substantive, "natural law" theory of procedural due process. Posner
first found that the plaintiff had a property right because a "good
cause" standard was implied in the license.3 62 Posner inferred that
good cause standard because standardless statutes are particularly
suspect: "The letter of due process would be observed-the depriva-
tion would be pursuant to a duly enacted ordinance explicitly devoid
of standards and hence not vague in the lack-of-notice sense. But the
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1453.
360. Id. at 1452.
361. Baer v. City of Wauwatosa, 716 F.2d 1117 (7th Cir. 1983).
362. Id. at 1122.
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spirit of due process-protection from arbitrary government action-
would be violated. 3
63
Posner found that due process "places a residual substantive lim-
itation on a state's depriving a person of life, liberty, or property: the
deprivation must have a rational basis in some lawful interest of the
state.' ' 36 In an extraordinary passage, Posner explained why he was
not a positivist:
Although since Board of Regents v. Roth it has been customary to
think of property as the emanation of state or federal law, rather
than the product of human work as John Locke thought, there
may be limits, as yet untested, to this idea. If a state decreed that
every new business would have to have a state license revocable at
will, the older view that some property rights are natural rather
than created by government-a view still occasionally encountered
in the cases-might be resurrected and might, in combination with
the concept of vagueness as absence of standards, make such a law
invalid under the due process clause.365
It is difficult to imagine Judges Bork or Scalia writing such sentences.
Posner provided another example of his property/contract dis-
tinction when he held that state employees could not prevail on their
§ 1983 action seeking immediate payment of money owed for over-
time work or compensatory leave.366 This time Posner commenced
his analysis by giving historical authority for his distinction: "[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to shift the whole of the
public law of the states into the federal courts. 3 6 Although all con-
tract rights were not constitutionally protected property interests,
other interests, such as welfare, were covered: "[lit [is] evident that
the Supreme Court considered the common law definition of 'prop-
erty' too confining to achieve the objectives of the due process
clause."36 Consequently, courts must make a policy assessment:
"Both security of tenure and importance to the holder of the right are
illustrated by the teacher's tenure right in Sindermann. 369
Posner's reformulation of the procedural due process doctrine is
dazzling. Remaining reasonably consistent with precedent, he has
offered a methodology that allows a court to provide meaningful pro-
cedural protection to people who may lose their jobs, their licenses,
363. Id. at 1124.
364. Id. at 1123.
365. Id. at 1125 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
366. Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1983).
367. Id. at 364.
368. Id. at 363.
369. Id. at 364 (referring to Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
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their ability to work in their chosen field, or their welfare benefits,
without permitting every state personnel action to end up in federal
court. For instance, he concluded that a policeman had no property
interest when being demoted from chief detective, but had a protected
property interest in his tenured job as an ordinary policeman. 370 Dis-
tinctions along such lines should be made. There have to be some
limits to procedural due process in the state workplace; otherwise, a
state employee could sue in federal court because he did not receive
proper reimbursement for driving his car ten miles while on the job.
Expanding procedural due process to protect all livelihood interests-
ranging from "freedom of occupation" to welfare-provides a coher-
ent baseline, supplementing the common law interests in personal and
real property. I believe, however, courts should also protect other
interests, and anticipate disagreements over where those additional
lines should be drawn; these disputes will be similar to the ones that
will arise over how lines should be drawn within Posner's structure.
For example, Posner wrote that but for Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co. ,37I he would not find a cause of action to be a protected property
interest.3 72 Under his theory, plaintiffs could therefore lose their
claim solely because the state never got around to processing their
claim in time.
Posner has not been as willing to redefine "liberty" interests as he
has some "property" interests. For example, he held that prisoners
had no independent liberty interest, but that they had a "right" to
reduced sentencing under a federal "good time" statute.373 On the
other hand, he held that dissident nonunion members had a due pro-
cess right to a full hearing with judicial review to determine if they
had been forced to contribute to nonbusiness-related activities
because: "The liberty in question is freedom of association. '374
Posner reached a far more shocking conclusion when he wrote
that children had little or no liberty interest in staying with their natu-
ral parents because when the state intervened, the children were only
370. Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 693-94 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 828 (1985). Posner has held plaintiffs have no property right to a promotion. Bigby v.
City of Chicago, 766 F.2d 1053, 1057 (7th Cir. 1985). Posner explained that his "liberty of
occupation" theory did not apply because a rank within an occupation is not an occupation.
Id.
371. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
372. In re Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac. R.R. Co., 788 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986).
Posner would prefer to find that only meritorious causes of action are protected property
interests.
373. Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 861 (1983).
374. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1193, 1196 (7th Cir.
1984).
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going from "one form of bondage to another."'375 Posner apparently
had not heard of "separation anxiety," the enormous stress children
feel when they are removed from their parents.376 Posner continued
this approach when he concluded that parents had no liberty interest
in not being disturbed: "Peace of mind is not liberty. ' 377 What
makes these callous assessments of family needs and of privacy so
disturbing is that they were gratuitous. Posner could have simply
relied upon his other argument that the father had not been damaged
by the state's failure to give him proper initial notice, because the state
proved at a subsequent hearing that the father was very dangerous
and had beaten his children: "So plaintiffs have failed to establish a
causal connection between the alleged deprivation of due process and
any injury resulting from the removal of the children . . . and the
principles of tort causation apply to constitutional as to other tort
suits." 378
Posner's far-ranging liberty analysis could immunize the state
whenever it broke up any family, not just those terrorized by danger-
ous parents. In fact, in a similar case, Ellis v. Hamilton,379 Posner
conceded, while taking a swipe at the Supreme Court's use of "sub-
stantive due process," that some such liberty interest existed:
We do not think any exotic constitutional doctrine-not even the
ubiquitous oxymoron "substantive due process"-would be neces-
sary in order to reach that result. It is plain to us that the "liberty"
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
includes the right to custody of one's minor children and that it
would be a deprivation of that liberty without due process of law
for persons acting under color of state law permanently to separate
the children from their parents without notice and hearing.38 °
One of the most difficult problems currently facing the federal
courts is the determination of when to award damages for injuries
under the due process clause. Such due process claims, which could
include negligence, recklessness, malice, or even sadism, are peculiar
hybrids of procedural and substantive due process. Under all those
situations, the plaintiff's interest in "life, liberty, and property" have
been impaired without any hearing; nevertheless, the question
remains whether plaintiff should have a substantive right to compen-
sation. Posner has tried to solve this problem by relying on contro-
375. Lossman v. Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 290 (7th Cir. 1983).
376. See, e.g., J. BOWLBY, SEPARATION (1973).
377. Lossman, 707 F.2d at 292.
378. Id. at 291.
379. 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
380. Id. at 512.
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versial philosophical assumptions about the Constitution instead of
merely basing his decision upon the Supreme Court's decision in Par-
ratt v. Taylor,381 which prohibited an action under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment for negligent loss of property.
Denying relief to the estate of a person who had been murdered by an
insane person recently released by state officials,38 2 Posner created a
global theory of the Constitution:
But there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state
against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous
if the state fails to protect the residents against such predators but
it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitu-
tion. The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the
state to let the people alone; it does not require the federal govern-
ment or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service
as maintaining law and order.383
Even the libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick might be trou-
bled by the totality of Posner's theory. According to Nozick, the
state's primary justification is its ability to protect citizens from each
other and from outsiders.384 Posner's position races beyond constitu-
tional immunity for inevitable state error to create total constitutional
immunity for state desertion of duty. He does not distinguish between
failure to properly implement existing services and failure to provide
any services at all. Furthermore, his vision does not explain how a
court should handle claims that the state acted recklessly when it
injured a party.
Posner continued to apply this theory when he ruled against an
estate in Jackson v. City of Joliet 385 where administrators of estates
sought damages because police officers failed to rescue people who
burned to death in their car. According to Posner, the plaintiffs had
to prove that the police officers acted deliberately. 86 The state has no
duty to provide any resources, except to criminal defendants. Both to
381. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Posner did use Parratt to hold that a plaintiff who had been
denied a taxicab license had no procedural due process claim where the plaintiff had alleged
that the defendant had not followed existing procedures because state remedies existed.
Flower Cab Co. v. Petitte, 685 F.2d 192, 193 (7th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has
extended Parratt to deny relief to a prison inmate who slipped on a pillow that a deputy sheriff
left on stairs in the jail, Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986), and to an inmate who
alleged that prison officials negligently failed to protect him from another inmate, Davidson v.
Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
382. Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
383. Id. at 618.
384. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
385. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983).
386. Id. at 1203.
1232
CONSTRAINTS OF POWER
support his philosophy and to resolve the immediate issue, Posner
turned to history for additional support: "What happened in this case
is not the kind of thing that the framers were not concerned about
because they could not foresee but the kind of thing they knew about
and surely did not think required a federal tort remedy to prevent.
387
Posner added that rejection of his theory would lead to adopting the
views of Professor Michelman, who had proposed that the state must
provide "just needs" under the equal protection clause:388
To adopt these proposals, however, would be more than an exten-
sion of traditional conceptions of the due process clause. It would
turn the clause on its head. It would change it from a protection
against coercion by state government to a command that the state
use its taxing power to coerce some of its citizens to provide serv-
ices to others. The Supreme Court has refused to go so far except
where indigence prevents an individual (a criminal defendant in
particular) from protecting himself against coercion by the state.389
Whatever else one may think of Posner's sweeping constitutional
jurisprudence, one should remember that it does not perfectly capture
Supreme Court precedent. In Plyler v. Doe,39 ° the Court held that
states had a constitutional responsibility to pay for the education of
the children of illegal aliens. Furthermore, one does not have to turn
the Constitution into a socialist document or a tort code to conclude
that the state has a constitutional duty to provide minimal services
and/or not to act recklessly.
2. THE PROCESS THAT IS DUE
Once a court has found that a plaintiff has a right to procedural
protection under the Constitution, that court must then determine
what specific procedures the plaintiff should receive. Posner acknowl-
edged the Supreme Court's repudiation of Justice Rehnquist's and
Judge Easterbrook's positivist position that the plaintiff should only
receive procedures previously authorized by law.39 Instead, he has
used the Mathews v. Eldridge three-pronged balancing test, "a simple
cost-benefit test of general applicability. '392
In general, he has found that existing procedures tend to be satis-
387. Id. at 1205. He offered no legislative history of the fourteenth amendment to support
this speculation.
388. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1979).
389. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203-04 (citation omitted).
390. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
391. Philly's v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87, 91 (7th Cir. 1984).
392. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982).
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factory. A city could immediately tow cars because advance notice
and hearing would not only be expensive, but would also prevent all
ticketing. 393 Prisoners threatened by loss of good time credit had no
right to sworn testimony by prison officers because those inmates had
received precise notice of the charge and of the identity of the witness:
"[T]hese prisoners had the essential elements of an adversary hearing
in the Anglo-American tradition."3 94 An administrative agency
allowing a railroad to abandon a line may act regrettably when it fails
to articulate standards, but it still is acting within its power. 395 That
same bureaucracy may dismiss evidence out of hand and not explic-
itly consider valid points a claimant may have asserted.396 A person
who was injured by a railroad when he was a child had no cause of
action after his mother failed to respond to a notice from a bank-
ruptcy trustee.397
D. Substantive Due Process
We shall start with Posner's snide reference in Ellis v. Hamilton
to that "ubiquitous oxymoron 'substantive due process.' "98 Posner
made that quip while citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland 399 in Ellis
where he noted that parents have a liberty interest in the custody of
their minor children. Posner claimed that this substantive definition
of liberty could be found without relying upon "substantive due pro-
cess."'  He does not explain how he accomplished that task. After
all, the family's interest is substantive and the court would have to
proceed under the due process clause. In fact, in Moore, the Court
explicitly held that zoning laws regulating family structure violated
substantive due process. Even if the court chose another clause-the
eighth amendment, for example--critics would still claim that the
court was really engaging in substantive due process decision-making.
Posner glossed over the methodology needed to reach the conclu-
sion that families have a liberty interest in staying together because he
was struggling with a dilemma of contemporary conservative consti-
tutional theory. Modem conservatives criticize the pro-abortion deci-
sions for being based upon an allegedly unprincipled, ahistorical
reading of the due process clause: "substantive due process." But if
393. Id. at 646.
394. Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 861 (1983).
395. Illinois v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 709 F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1983).
396. Illinois v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 722 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1983).
397. In re Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac. R.R. Co., 788 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986).
398. Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
399. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
400. Ellis, 669 F.2d at 512.
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all substance were eliminated from due process, how could conserva-
tives oppose, as unconstitutional, state decisions to remove children
for any reason or to limit the size of families? Or, for that matter,
how could they challenge state attacks on "liberty of occupation"?
Conservatives cannot have it both ways. If substantive due process is
an illegitimate methodology, then the state has total discretion to reg-
ulate the family and the job market.
In the course of rejecting a fireman's suit brought against a city
because it fired him for not living in the city and disrupted his family
life, Posner again expressed reluctant skepticism about substantive
due process:
Granted, it is not easy to derive a doctrine of substantive family
rights from the language or history of the Fourteenth Amendment;
but the doctrine is far too well established to be questioned at our
level; our only task is to apply it as best we can to the facts of this
case.
40 1
While rejecting a constitutional attack claiming that an employment
examination was inadequately conceived,4 °2 Posner reduced substan-
tive due process to emotivism: "[T]he concept [of substantive due
process] has been used to invalidate state action unrelated to judicial
or administrative procedure or to specific rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights only when that action was deeply repulsive to the feel-
ings of Supreme Court Justices." 3
Unlike Judge Bork, Judge Posner has not actively applied the
"taking" doctrine to expand substantive due process to protect
wealth, even though his former colleague, Professor Richard A.
Epstein, recently proposed such a constitutional maneuver. 404 When
reviewing a state's purchase of an abandoned railroad line, Posner
held that the state need only pay what it would be worth after aban-
donment, not what it would be valued at as a continuing railroad even
though the state planned to continue service." 5 Posner indicated that
the railroad is only entitled to "what a liquidating railroad could
obtain in the marketplace."'"4 6 To support that holding, Posner
claimed that courts were poorly equipped to determine the railway's
401. Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 642 (7th Cir. 1985). Posner explained
that the Constitution may prohibit some direct regulation of family life, such as setting zoning
requirements for family structure, but it will not proscribe most laws that "collaterally" affect
families. Id. at 643.
402. Bigby v. City of Chicago, 766 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 793
(1986).
403. Id. at 1058.
404. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 279-81 (1985).
405. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 665, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1982).
406. Id. at 667.
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maximum value: "The maximum value of the line to GLA [the
transit commission] is a function very largely of the political muscle
of GLA's constituents-an area of inquiry that courts, even the ICC,
... are poorly equipped to explore. ' ' 4° 7 Thus, we see the makings of
another surprise that may be emerging from this admittedly limited
set of cases. Judge Bork, the allegedly restrained traditionalist, may
be more willing to apply economic substantive due process via the
taking clause than Judge Posner, the leader of the law and economics
movement.
E. Equal Protection
When I studied these jurists' academic writings in the previous
article, I expressed anxieties over Posner's tendency to reduce law to
economic analysis. Clearly, as a jurist, he has adopted a broader
vision than that contained in most of his writings. For instance, he
responded to a plaintiff's equal protection argument in which the
plaintiff disputed a city's car towing procedures with a Frankfurtian
reaction: "The sense of justice is not outraged."" ° Indeed, in one
case he explicitly rejected the "proper" economic conclusion. An out-
of-state lawyer who argued that he should not have to take the bar
lost his appeal because Posner maintained that the state had a legiti-
mate purpose in preserving the quality of the bar." 9 Posner thought
the lawyer had a strong argument on the merits: "[T]he licensing of
lawyers is an anachronism or worse; ... a free market in legal services
will yield the optimal quality at the optimal price."410 Nevertheless,
"we do not think that the equal protection clause ordains in effect a
national bar .. "41
Posner has rigorously applied the rational relationship test to
deny plaintiffs relief. States can allocate their limited resources to tow
only vehicles that have more than one parking violation.41 2 A fireman
could not complain that he was dismissed for living outside of a city
although others in similar circumstances were not being punished
because "incomplete enforcement of the law is the norm in this coun-
try. ' 4 13 Posner used an economic argument to help provide a
"rational purpose" why states can have different liability standards
for vehicular torts than for nonvehicular torts:
407. Id. at 670.
408. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1982).
409. Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 862 (1986).
410. Id. at 663.
411. Id.
412. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1982).
413. Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Since motor vehicle accidents are so much more frequent than
other types of accidents in which state employees are involved, the
mathematical law of large numbers enables the state to estimate
and provide for its liability without placing any limitation on the
amount of damages that can be awarded in an individual case.41 4
In the murky, discretionary area of intermediate scrutiny, Posner
has not been relentlessly hostile to plaintiffs. Recall the access case in
which he ruled that counties did not receive eleventh amendment
immunity and that they had to prove that fifty-five was an appropriate
age at which to require policemen to retire.41 5
Joined by Judge Easterbrook in his opinion, Judge Posner also
did not completely reject a sex discrimination suit, although his analy-
sis will undoubtedly trouble many feminists.4 16 Posner first argued
that women generally are paid less because they take time off to raise
children. 1 7 Nevertheless, Posner contended, states may be more
likely to discriminate against women because states have less incentive
to be efficient than private employers;41 ' governmental decisions are
more likely to be influenced by politics, including bias, than business
decisions. Given these controversial assumptions, Posner concluded
that a court should not intervene just because a state did not follow a
comparative worth study.419 The main effect of such a holding
"would be to discourage employers from commissioning comparative
worth studies. ' '4 E To prevail, the women had to show improper state
intent, not just knowledge of disparate impact: "Knowledge of a dis-
parity is not the same thing as an intent to cause or maintain it."42 1
Consequently, their comparative worth argument had no constitu-
tional weight.422 The women, however, did raise several factual alle-
gations that could constitute a constitutional violation: steering of
women into low-paying jobs, poor job classifications, hand picking of
employees based upon gender, exclusions based upon gender, uneven
layoffs, and different classifications for the same jobs.4 23 Addressing
the problems of designing an appropriate remedy, Posner became a
414. Continental Ins. Co. v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 709 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1983).
415. Heiar v. Crawford County, Wis., 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3500 (1985).
416. American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
417. Id. at 719.
418. Id. at 720.
419. Id. at 723.
420. Id. at 721.
421. Id. at 722.
422. See, e.g., Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1728 (1986).
423. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 728.
1986] 1237
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1171
judicial activist: "But if difficulties of remedy, unless completely
insurmountable, were a proper reason for throwing out a complaint at
the pleading stage, Brown v. Board of Education would have been
decided in favor of allowing public schools to continue to segregate
the races. 4 24
Posner's analysis of racial issues has not been predictably con-
servative. He opposed a plan which gave black school teachers total
seniority over white teachers during lay-offs, 425 a position with which
the Supreme Court recently agreed.426 But he did not reject all forms
of affirmative action. He stated, "Affirmative action in hiring is some-
times permitted, but it is not mandatory," '427 even though he criticized
the remedy in his academic writings.428
When a majority held in United States v. Board of School Com-
missioners, that only the state, not the suburbs, should pay the costs of
school desegregation because only the state was found responsible for
violations,429 Judge Posner wrote a scathing dissent that not only
revealed limits to his reliance on economics (particularly to favor the
wealthy), but also showed his political courage. First, he did not
sound like an economist while allocating costs: "The end of an equity
suit is an injunction, or if the injunction is not obeyed a contempt
proceeding; it is not an inquiry into who will bear the costs of the
injunction."43 Posner then cut through legal fictions to explain who
was truly responsible for the segregation: "I would consider it highly
unlikely that a school district could cause, and so in a legal sense be
424. Id. at 730 (citation omitted).
425. Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J., dissenting). Posner did deny a request that federal court clerks investigate why
some people do not respond to jury questionnaires. Posner observed that the plaintiffs had not
proven systematic discrimination against counties with large black populations. United States
v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1984).
426. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
427. Britton, 775 F.2d at 816. The whites were not barred from bringing this suit merely
because the union approved the contract. Id. at 819. The whites had not consented to the
plan. Id. at 820. Thus, in this circumstance, Posner did not employ a broad definition of
"implied consent" to bind the workers. He did not analogize their plight to the dilemma of a
homeowner who buys a home that depreciates in value when a factory moves away. Yet union
agreements with unfavorable terms are no less foreseeable than company plant closings. For a
discussion of the role consent plays in Posner's jurisprudence, see West, Authority, Autonomy,
and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and
Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
428. See, e.g., Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of 'Affirmative Action', 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 171 (1979); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment
of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1. Posner did not follow his pattern of expressing
reservations in his opinion about existing Supreme Court doctrine.
429. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 677 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1982).
430. Id. at 1192 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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liable for, segregation between districts . . . . [I]t is the residents of
the white suburbs of Marion County who are the primary wrongdo-
ers, as a matter of equity if not of law .. . Posner thought it
unjust that the rest of the state should subsidize wealthy suburbs
which have engaged in discrimination:
In light of this history, for the suburban school districts, which are
apparently among the richest in the state, to urge that the costs of
the busing order should be borne by the people throughout the
state who are dependent on the noneducational appropriations in
the state budget and that the educational budgets of Marion
County should be sacrosanct is to invoke the spirit not of equity
but of effrontery.432
What makes this remarkably straightforward opinion so admirable is
that it was unnecessary; Posner could have easily joined the majority
in finding the state to be solely liable. As we have already seen in the
eleventh amendment context, the constitutional distinctions between
state and local governments are extremely ambiguous.
On the other hand, he did revert to an economic interpretation
when he held in Jones v. Reagan, that black reservists could not pre-
vail on their argument that the Reserve transferred them for racially
motivated reasons because they only sought punitive damages: "It is
enough for us to hold that damage remedies for constitutional torts
are not appropriate and hence not available, unless expressly author-
ized by Congress, if no monetizable injury is alleged." '433
F. First Amendment
1. THE STATE AS EMPLOYER OR CONTRACTOR
Just as in due process cases, Judge Posner focused upon the
severe deprivation of job loss to determine the scope of the first
amendment when the state has injured an employee or contractor.
Those who lost their jobs for political reasons received significant sub-
stantive and procedural protection, while other plaintiffs remained
virtually unprotected. Thus, a police officer had a valid due process
cause of action against a city which constructively discharged him
after he investigated his boss's daughter, but had no similar claims for
being demoted from chief detective.4 34 Furthermore, the policeman's
substantive right generated new procedural rights. Existing arbitra-
431. Id. at 1192-93.
432. Id. at 1193-94.
433. Jones v. Reagan, 696 F.2d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1983).
434. Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 693-94 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 828 (1985).
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tion procedures were inadequate because the arbitrator did not con-
sider post-transfer evidence of harassment, decided cases slowly, and
could not award full compensation because he could only grant back
pay.43
5
In a dissent from an opinion upholding the firing of a bookkeeper
for allegedly valid nonpolitical reasons, Posner responded that the
plaintiff appeared to have been fired for two reasons: "her failure to
perform as a faithful public servant, and her siding with Dr. McCar-
thy." '436 According to Posner, the trial judge erred both by not giving
protection to those involved in primary politics within a party, and by
not applying the classic "but for" tort test: "If she would not have
been fired but for her taking sides in a political struggle, then the
defendants violated her First Amendment rights .... -
Finally, a secretary had a right to have a jury decide if she
deserved protection because she was a regular state employee or if she
could be fired because she was a confidential secretary:
Rightly or wrongly, our system commits the decision of complex
as well as simple facts, facts tinctured with legal or policy signifi-
cance (such as negligence) as well as the who-did-what-to-whom
facts that can be found without any instruction in the law, to the
jury in cases in which a right to a jury trial is given.438
Applying the other part of the occupation/conditions of employ-
ment distinction, Posner held that the first amendment does not pro-
hibit the state from awarding a contract to a politically favored
bidder: "It is not like losing your job .... An independent contrac-
tor would tend we imagine to feel a somewhat lesser sense of
dependency.
4 39
Far more troubling was Posner's conclusion that an F.B.I. agent
could not invoke the first amendment to contest a job transfer or even
a subsequent discharge because the speech in question directly
affected immediate superiors, morale, confidentiality, and disci-
pline."' Posner did not worry about "liberty of occupation":
Government law enforcement agencies, whether they be the
FBI, Secret Service, U.S. Marshall, local police forces, sheriffs, etc.,
435. Id. at 697.
436. Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d 1221, 1236 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting).
437. Id. at 1235.
438. Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 289 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2360 (1985).
439. LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044
(1984).
440. Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983). Posner
held that the speech could "presume to have had a substantial disruptive influence on the
regular operations of the department." Id. at 327.
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are indeed very similar to the military in terms of the need for
direction, supervision, discipline, confidentiality, efficiency and
esprit de corps. Thus, courts should defer, whenever possible con-
sistent with the Constitution, to the superior expertise of law
enforcement professionals in dealing with their respective
personnel." 1
Posner's conclusion, of course, is similar to Scalia's conclusion in
Molerio.
2. THE STATE AS REGULATOR OF SPEECH
One might have predicted that Posner, an advocate of the free
market, would be a more vigorous defender of the first amendment
than a traditionalist such as Judge Bork because the first amendment
protects the "marketplace of ideas," a libertarian-economic metaphor
with which Posner is comfortable. Indeed, Posner used that image
when requiring the state to provide dissident nonunion teachers with
a better forum than arbitration proceedings to protect their constitu-
tional right not to contribute to nonbusiness-related issues: "this indi-
rect effect on the marketplace of ideas is we think sufficient to require
the creation of procedures that protect against such compulsion." 4
42
Nevertheless, Posner has not read the first amendment as broadly as
Bork, who has sometimes enhanced values he believes the first amend-
ment protects.
Remember that Posner dismissed two first amendment cases on
procedural grounds." 3  In Waldron v. McAtee, 4 " Posner demon-
strated his willingness to blend procedure and substance at the
expense of the plaintiff, a law student whom the police had threatened
to arrest under a loitering statute.445 Posner's tightening of standing,
ripeness, abstention, vagueness, and overbreadth may not totally con-
flict with Supreme Court doctrine, but he turned those complex doc-
trines into virtually impenetrable Catch-22's. Posner held, under the
Pullman abstention doctrine, that the plaintiff had to go first to state
441. Id. at 328.
442. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986). In the course of denying an antitrust suit contesting an exclusion
from a professional organization, Posner expressed similar sentiments when he linked the first
amendment freedom of association with the right to privately exchange views: "If the
Academy has to reveal its membership files, members may be reluctant to offer candid
evaluations of applicants, and the atmosphere of mutual confidence that encourages a free
exchange of ideas will be eroded." Marrese v. American Academy Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726
F.2d 1150, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
443. See People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167
(7th Cir. 1984); Waldron v. McAtee, 723 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1983) (Pullman abstention).
444. 723 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1983).
445. Id.
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court: "It is quite possible therefore that the police exceeded their
authority under the ordinance and that the Indiana courts will make
this clear.""' 6 Thus, as the dissent observed, this interpretation of the
Pullman test, which Posner had described elsewhere as a "time
waster,"" 7 would require all first amendment plaintiffs alleging over-
breadth or vagueness claims to litigate their claims in state court
unless they could produce a state court ruling finding that their activ-
ity was proscribed by the challenged law." 8 The dissent noted that
the Supreme Court did not require exhaustion in most first amend-
ment cases. 449 After all, vagueness challenges are brought, by defini-
tion, against poorly drafted statutes, statutes which usually may be
more narrowly construed by state courts. Under Posner's theory,
plaintiffs who have been arrested must litigate their case in state court
under Younger and plaintiffs who have not been arrested, but still
have standing, must also litigate their cases in state court.
Posner narrowly construed the vagueness doctrine, deemphasiz-
ing its due process role in requiring adequate notice: "The practical
effect of the vagueness doctrine is not to make statutes readable by the
laity but to limit the discretion of police and prosecutors ....
That statist construction ignores the fact that one of the best ways to
constrain discretion is to make laws intelligible to the average citizen
as well as to the average law enforcement official. If a police officer
does not know what he cannot do, he may do anything. Meanwhile,
the average citizen cannot determine the scope of the officer's power if
the relevant statute is too vague, and thus will not know when to turn
to the courts for protection.
When a district court heard a request to determine if new F.B.I.
surveillance standards were consistent with a prior consent decree
regulating how the F.B.I. could oversee controversial domestic polit-
ical activists, Judge Posner held, in Alliance to End Repression v. City
of Chicago, that the court acted prematurely, even if it had jurisdic-
tion.451 He used a very contemporaneous "changed circumstances"
argument to justify not deferring to the trial court: "Much has
changed since then-not only the management of the Bureau, whose
present director is a former federal circuit judge, but the magnitude of
446. Id. at 1354.
447. Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 568 (7th Cir. 1986).
448. Waldron, 723 F.2d at 1355 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
449. Id. at 1356-57 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964)).
450. Waldron, 723 F.2d at 1354.
451. 733 F.2d 1187, 1196-97 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting), vacated, 742
F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the terrorist threat, which has increased. 4-2
Unlike Judges Bork and Scalia, who held that an artist had a
constitutional right to display his satirical poster in a subway, Judge
Posner expressed little sympathy for artist plaintiffs. In Piarowski v.
Illinois Community College,453 an artist sued a community college for
ordering him to relocate several stained-glass windows from a general
exhibit of faculty artwork, located on the school's mall, to a room on
the fourth floor.454 The works were "in the style of Audbrey Beards-
ley."14 5  Several people had complained about three representational
pieces that portrayed "brown women" engaging in sexually demean-
ing acts. For instance, one of the pieces "depicts the naked rump of a
brown woman, and sticking out from (or into) it a white cylinder that
resembles a finger but on careful inspection is seen to be a jet of
gas."'456 In another, a brown woman is on her knees, worshipping a
white man's gigantic phallus. 57 Posner impugned the plaintiff's
motives, claiming the artist was more interested in being a martyr.458
Finding that the hallway was not a public forum despite the display of
other pieces there,459 Posner applied a balancing test even though the
school"6 clearly engaged in content discrimination:
When we consider that the expression in this case was not
political, that it was regulated rather than suppressed, that the
plaintiff is not only a faculty member but an administrator, that
good alternative sites may have been available to him, and that in
short he is claiming a First Amendment right to exhibit sexually
explicit and racially offensive artwork in what amounts to be the
busiest corridor in a college ... [the college may] ... order him to
move it.
46 1
Because he did not label these works "obscene, ' 462 Posner had
begun to slide down the slippery slope to egregious content discrimi-
452. Id. at 1197.
453. 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 528 (1985).
454. Id.
455. Id. at 627.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 632.
459. Id. at 629.
460. Posner also showed how that first amendment theme of "academic freedom" does not
resolve the tension between a state school and an individual employee. He noted that a tension
exists between the individual need for academic freedom and the institution's need to be free
from governmental regulation (including the courts). Id. at 629-30. Thus, the courts, who
should be primarily the guardians of individual first amendment rights become constrained
from active enforcement because of Posner's deference to first amendment rights of academic
institutions.
461. Id. at 632.
462. Id. at 627. The defendants did not argue that the works were obscene. Indeed, as
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nation. One might agree with those who found some or all of the
displays to be both vulgar and politically inappropriate. Most aca-
demics would not like to see a display of fascist art in their schools,
but many would not want to see it banned. For instance, I find the
movie Rambo disturbing and disgusting, but I would not want to stop
students from seeing it. After all, Birth of a Nation is both one of the
world's greatest films and one of its most racist films, and is fre-
quently shown to students. On the other hand, a faculty member has
no right to display obscene art in public. But by making nonobscene
art a less protected form of speech and by allowing viewer discomfort
to prevail over individual expression in the absence of any finding of
obscenity, Posner has created a disturbing precedent. He also glossed
over the political content of the art; the three pieces may have been
intended as a protest against white male sexual domination of black
women.
Posner continued to express ambivalence about providing first
amendment protection to art during his review, in Douglass v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., of a "false light" tort action an actress filed against
Hustler magazine for displaying nude photographs of her without her
permission."' Her prior posing for Playboy magazine did not defeat
her case because a jury might conclude that Hustler was a less reputa-
ble magazine.464 Turning to the first amendment defense, Posner
found, in a passage some might consider witty and others might find
tasteless, that the plaintiff was a public figure "in a literal sense. '465
He used this case as an opportunity to express his regrets about broad
constructions of the first amendment:
As an original matter one might want to confine the class of
public figures to government officials and other politicians; free-
dom of political speech, and in particular freedom to criticize gov-
ernment officials and aspirants to public office, was the original
concern of the First Amendment. But it is too late in the day to
make such a distinction, at least at this judicial level. Art, even of
the questionable sort represented by erotic photographs in "pro-
vocative" magazines-even of the artless sort represented by "top-
less" dancing-today enjoys extensive protection in the name of
the First Amendment.466
Posner observed, the windows were based upon Beardsley illustrations displayed in the
Victoria and Albert Museum. Id.
463. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1489 (1986).
464. Id. at 1137.
465. Id. at 1141.
466. Id. Posner has been unresponsive to an electoral access case, which combines the first
amendment and equal protection. In response to a suit brought by the Communist Party
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3. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
In the only major freedom of religion case decided by any of the
five judges, Judge Posner lucidly described how he would weigh the
plaintiffs' interests in wearing yarmulkes when they played basketball
against the state's interest in safety:
As under any balancing test, each case tends to be sui generis, so
that the principal value of precedent is to identify the interests that
must be weighed and to tell us whether, in weighing them, we
should place our thumb on one pan or the other. Sherbert indi-
cates that our thumb should be on the claimant's pan, because it
says that the state's interest must be "compelling" to outweigh the
claimant's.4 67
Posner did not press too hard with his thumb. The plaintiffs had the
burden of proof; the state did not have to wait until somebody slipped
on a yarmulke. Yet Posner sought a compromise in a clever remand
of the case. He thought the case might be a "false conflict;" other
headgear might be safer, while still complying with Orthodox require-
ments. Because the plaintiffs know more about Jewish law than the
defendants, the plaintiffs had the burden of proposing new designs.468
G. Government Structure
Because they sat on the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia bench, Judges Scalia and Bork considered several federal
separation of powers cases. Judge Posner's structural constitutional
cases more frequently involved the relationship between the states
and the federal government. Posner continued the pattern he estab-
lished in the access cases-praising the rights of the states, but often
ruling in favor of national power.
In response to the argument that a legislature had delegated too
challenging a state law raising party registration requirements from .5 to two percent, Posner
replied that courts did not scrutinize such regulations as closely as they did laws involving race
or political speech. Hall v. Simcox, 766 F.2d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 528
(1985). According to Posner, the new limit was acceptable and was not the result of improper
motivation. Writing like a historian, he conceded that a major motive may have been the
"traditional American antipathy to the coalition governments that minor parties precipitate."
Id. at 1176.
467. Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983). Posner also considered a religious challenge to compulsory
education laws under the first amendment, noting that "[tihere is little . . . likelihood that
Indiana's compulsory-schooling law will be held unconstitutional." Mazanec v. North
Judson-San Pierre School Corp., 763 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1985). After this article went to
press, Posner held that the ACLU was entitled to a preliminary injunction proscribing a city's
display of a lighted Latin cross during Christmas. American Civil Liberties Union v. City of
St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
468. Menora, 683 F.2d at 1035.
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much power to a state agency regulating alcohol, Posner held that no
federal constitutional doctrine exists limiting state delegation of pow-
ers to an administrative agency.469 The federal doctrine of separation
of powers did not apply to the states: "[T]he Constitution nowhere
requires states to have a tripartite system of government. ' 470 Posner
even revived his scholarly argument that federal courts should only be
concerned with interstate externalities, not internal injustice: "If you
didn't like Huey Long's Louisiana, you could move to a different
state; tyranny at the federal level is more difficult to escape. "471
Posner also rebuffed a fireman's due process claim with federal-
ism arguments: "The principles of federalism require ... that the due
process clause not be interpreted to place more stringent procedural
constraints on state agencies than the same language in the Fifth
Amendment, plus the Administrative Procedure Act and the body of
federal administrative case law, places on federal agencies. "472 We
have also seen that he sometimes used the remand power to allow the
states to correct possible injustices before federal court intervention
because he thought that process better promoted comity.47 3
Posner did not hesitate, in Indianapolis Airport v. American Air-
lines, Inc. ,7 to strike down the user fees for airlines at a local airport.
He used economic theory to interpret the dormant commerce clause:
"Locational monopoly-the type of monopoly that the Indianapolis
airport enjoys-is one of the traditional levers by which a state can (if
not prevented) unreasonably burden interstate commerce. '475 In Illi-
nois v. General Electric Co., Posner found that a state law, which pro-
scribed the shipment of spent nuclear fuel, was a violation of the
commerce clause because the state still allowed intrastate shipments.
Posner shed crocodile tears for federalism: "[I]t is unseemly to allow
a single federal district judge to enjoin a state statute .... 476
469. United Beverage Co. v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage, 760 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1985).
470. Id. at 158.
471. Id.
472. Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 645 (7th Cir. 1985).
473. Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1986); Menora v.
Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983).
474. 733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).
475. Id. at 1267. He presented a pragmatic explanation why federal courts can employ the
dormant commerce clause to strike down state laws in the absence of congressional legislation:
[T]his interpretation of the commerce clause can be defended on the practical
ground that Congress is too busy-and maybe as James Madison feared too
factionalized-to police every infringement of the policy (implied by a number of
separate provisions of the Constitution) that the United States be a single
"common market" for goods and services.
Id. at 1266.
476. 683 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
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Only once did Posner discuss separation of powers-in a dissent
from a decision holding that magistrates can try diversity cases if all
parties consent.477 Posner, who at the time was writing a book
describing how excessive caseload was damaging the federal court sys-
tem, 478 agreed that the procedure would help alleviate case overload.
Nevertheless, the values underlying the tenure provisions of Article
III should not be sacrificed for short-term benefits:
The caseload crisis makes the idea of invalidating section 636(c)
seem futile, unfair to the district courts, and ungrateful to Con-
gress: in short, ill advised.
This reaction is understandable, and if I could find more play
in the text and policies of Article III, section 1 than I have been
able to find, I might be swayed by it.4 79
Judge Posner again ranked policy above history-in a passage that
makes an appropriate end to this section because it nicely demon-
strates how Judge Posner's thinking differs from Judge Scalia's and
Judge Bork's views:
I am sympathetic to functional analysis and to flexible, nonlit-
eral constitutional interpretations, especially of a provision such as
Article III that belongs to the original Constitution, which means
it was written 197 years ago. But, speaking with great respect, I
think my brethren's argument takes too narrow a view of the func-
tions of the tenure and compensation provisions in several
respects.48°
IV. EASTERBROOK
Although Easterbrook has occasionally used economic analysis
in his constitutional adjudication, he has not let his economic perspec-
tive pressure him into a libertarian construction of the Constitution.
Indeed, he has probably been the most deferential of the five judges.
477. Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
478. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS (1985).
479. Geras, 742 F.2d at 1050.
480. Id. at 1051. Posner then explained that the tenure provisions protect judicial quality,
judicial independence, and even the states' interests. Id. at 1052. Magistrates are not
sufficiently independent because they are beholden to district judges. Id. at 1053.
Professor Carter has recently argued that historicism should play a major role in
construing the more determinate "political Constitution," or what I have called the
"structure." See Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A
Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985). Thus Carter might
agree with Posner's application of the tenure/compensation standard, but would base his
defense far more upon history. Posner also used historical arguments, including a reference to
the Federalist Papers, which eloquently defended judicial independence. Id. at 1046.
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Easterbrook has been a gleeful positivist, filling his opinions with fiery
prose that acknowledges his toleration of inefficiency and unfairness.
A. Access to Courts
Unlike Judge Posner, Judge Easterbrook has aggressively applied
the Supreme Court's eleventh amendment doctrine to deny monetary
relief to plaintiffs. He held that welfare recipients could not request a
federal court to issue a declaratory judgment determining if the state
improperly characterized tort compensation as disqualifying
"income" instead of as "resources," which the plaintiffs could spend
as they please.4"' Because the plaintiffs were seeking damages for
prior injuries, they could not prevail in federal court: "When there is
'no ongoing violation of federal law,' a suit against a state officer-a
suit the decision of which will as a practical matter bind the state-
should be treated for what it is: a suit against the state."48 2 The judge
reduced Ex Parte Young's authorization of injunctive relief to a "nar-
row and somewhat anomalous sidestep."48 Easterbrook did not dis-
cuss Posner's arguments in Heiar v. Crawford County48 4 that the
eleventh amendment is partially trumped by the subsequent four-
teenth amendment or that damages can be an incidental remedy to
injunctive relief. Admittedly Posner's arguments have less strength
after the Supreme Court decided Green v. Mansour,8 5 which held
that the eleventh amendment barred federal courts from issuing
declaratory orders that would lead to damage awards. Ranging
beyond the facts of the case, Easterbrook spiced his opinion with the
observation that his decision may lead to unfairness because states
could deny welfare benefits to people who have to spend most of their
award on medical benefits: "This may be heartless, but it is not
unlawful. '486
Just as Judges Scalia and Bork have included substantive values
within standing doctrine, Judge Easterbrook has substantively
expanded the procedural defense of governmental immunities. In
Walker v. Rowe,48 7 he held that the eleventh amendment prevented
the estates of prison guards from obtaining damages after prisoners
had killed the guards during a prison riot. The plaintiffs argued that
prisoners were able to murder the guards because of unsafe working
481. Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1986).
482. Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
483. Id. (construing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
484. 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3500 (1985).
485. 106 S. Ct. 423 (1985).
486. Watkins, 789 F.2d at 483.
487. 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986).
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conditions.488 They sought relief for the alleged due process viola-
tions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Judge Posner had avoided the
Younger abstention/ripeness "Catch-22" and had castigated a trial
judge for creating a "Catch-22" by preventing a prisoner from getting
a divorce in Lynk, Easterbrook designed a theory of immunity that
gave most plaintiffs the freedom to choose two different ways to lose:
[T]he "capacity" in which litigation proceeds is largely the plain-
tiff's choice. If the theory is that the defendant occupied a given
office, and the occupant had a duty (one attaching to any occupant
of the office) to do such-and-such, then we have an "official capac-
ity" suit. It avoids the immunities that apply to "individual capac-
ity" suits but is likely to be brought up short by the eleventh
amendment. If the theory is that the defendant did something that
is tortious independent of the office the defendant holds, we have
an "individual capacity" suit.
The plaintiff may plead a claim either way, and if he pleads
what is naturally an official capacity suit as an individual capacity
suit, he avoids the eleventh amendment but confronts a fatal prob-
lem-inability to prove personal responsibility. The plaintiff who
says that the occupant of a given office should have done some-
thing (by virtue of office) but neglected to do it fails for two rea-
sons: most provisions of the bill of rights do not forbid simple
neglect... and the constitution does not make supervisory office-
holders vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of their
subordinates.489
Easterbrook was not satisfied to deny relief because of a tough
reading of the eleventh amendment. Turning to the fourteenth
amendment, he held that gross negligence as well as negligence was
immunized behavior, basing that doctrinal expansion upon controver-
sial theories of the Constitution and of choice. He first reduced the
underlying tort doctrine to economic terms: negligence meant "that
the costs of reducing the risks were less than the benefits," while gross
negligence only signified "that the costs were substantially less than
the anticipated benefits."49 He conceded one exception: state offi-
cials can be liable when the state has taken physical custody of the
plaintiff, thereby becoming partially responsible for the plaintiff's
well-being.49 Prison officials, therefore, could be liable for negli-
gently failing to protect a prisoner's health, but they could not be sued
for negligently handling a prisoner's property.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 508.
490. Id. at 509.
491. Id. at 511. Posner, of course, designed a "Catch-22" for the law student.
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Easterbrook justified limiting governmental liability to inten-
tional acts by reiterating Posner's theory in Bowers v. DeVito: "the
bill of rights is a charter of negative liberties. 49 2 Under this metathe-
ory of the Constitution, the courts should totally defer to the resource
allocations made by the markets and the political processes: "The
level of safety to be provided by the police to the people-like the
level of safety to be provided to the police and prison guards-is
determined by political and economic forces, not by juries implement-
ing the due process clause."'4 93 Just like Posner in Bowers, Easter-
brook did not discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe 494
requiring the states to pay for the education of the children of illegal
aliens. Easterbrook also failed to consider the cases holding that
supervisors can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the acts of
their subordinates if they had poorly trained those employees, a
potentially large exception premised upon recklessness. 495
Easterbrook, in Walker, found additional substantive support in
his theory of choice. The guards had assumed the risk: "But the state
did not draft its guards; they enlisted, on terms they found satisfac-
tory, and they were free to quit whenever they pleased. '496 Easter-
brook concluded this praise of choice with an analogy that seems
callously cute, given the misery facing the guards' families: "[The
State] may not throw Daniel into the lions' den, but if Daniel chooses
to be a lion tamer in the state's circus, the state need not separate
Daniel from his charges with an impenetrable shield. ' ' 497 But Easter-
brook, in effect, held far more; the State can send Daniel in with a
shield of cardboard or fall asleep when Daniel begins to scream.
By characterizing all resource allocations and all "noninten-
tional" torts as unreviewable "tragic choices," Easterbrook has
ignored the fact that there is an element of intent, of choice, in all tort
law. We punish the negligent tortfeasor with damages because he or
she acted "unreasonably." Failure to pay reasonable attention is a
form of intention, of a state of mind. Perhaps we do not want always
to hold the government to a pure negligence standard under the Con-
stitution, just as we may not want to incorporate all contract law
under the due process clause. But it does not follow that the states
492. Id. at 510 (citing Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)). He also cited
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
493. Walker, 791 F.2d at 511.
494. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
495. See, e.g., Oliver, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983
After City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 151 (1986).
496. Walker, 791 F.2d at 511.
497. Id.
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should be immune whenever their omissions are total or their negli-
gence is gross. Gross negligence is a proxy for an intentional tort,
both in terms of proof and of moral responsibility. Such a standard is
similar to concluding that recklessness can be malice in media libel
cases.
Finally, Easterbrook's reasoning begs the crucial question when
he attempts to distinguish prisoner health cases under the eighth
amendment because the state is responsible for prisoners' well-being:
When is the state responsible to others? Easterbrook may be correct
in concluding that the plaintiffs have no "constitutional right to be
protected from a safe working environment," but it does not follow
that they have no constitutional protection from a totally unsafe,
hopelessly ill-managed one. The guards may have assumed normal
risks when they took inherently dangerous jobs, but they did not
assume that their employers could be totally indifferent to their fate.
They chose the job, but they did not choose to be completely unpro-
tected by a new theory of immunity that did not exist when they
accepted employment. Easterbrook should have remanded the case,
ordering the jury to determine if the state officials acted recklessly or
committed gross negligence (to the degree that the two torts differ).
In a dissent from a decision certifying a case to the Illinois
Supreme Court for clarification of state law, Citizens for John W.
Moore v. Board of Election Commissioners,49 Easterbrook expressed
some reservations about existing eleventh amendment doctrine. He
complained that the Supreme Court's requirement in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman 49 9 that only state courts can enjoin
state officials for violations of state law "may force a federal court to
reach constitutional issue[s] even though plausible state-law grounds
are available for decision."' Nevertheless, unlike Judge Bork in
Dronenburg, the homosexual rights case, Easterbrook felt obligated to
expand the doctrine when appropriate:
I must accept the law of sovereign immunity as it is, however, and
if the logic of a decision compels its extension to a situation not
expressly contemplated, a lower court must follow. There is no
principled escape from the analysis that produces the dismal con-
clusion that our court cannot do anything constructive with the
advice we have requested from the Supreme Court of Illinois.5°"
Easterbrook also expressed reservations about the Pullman defense:
498. 781 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
499. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
500. Citizensfor John W. Moore, 781 F.2d at 585.
501. Id. at 586.
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"abstention is an uncommon response to constitutional challenges to
statutes.
502
When a couple sued several administrators of the Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA) for failing to defer repayments, Easterbrook
held that the defendants could not be sued for failure to administer
properly a payment-deferral program: "Most of the Court's cases
deal with absolute immunity from tort liability. They hold that offi-
cials have immunity against damages for losses caused by acts within
the duties of their office."50 3 The judge once again used provocative
language to explain when governmental defendants can be sued:
"The defendants injured the Carsons by acting on an application for
deferral, in the scope of the normal activities of their jobs, rather than
(say) by shooting them. 50 4
Easterbrook explained that the source of the liability determines
the scope of the immunity. Congress could create the scope of liabil-
ity for statutes because it created the statutes. On the other hand,
Congress could not define the scope of constitutional torts: "The
political branches may not alter constitutional rules, and some rules
were written into the fundamental law out of concern that the polit-
ical branches would alter them if they could. ' 505 The Carsons, there-
fore, could proceed further with their first amendment claim and their
procedural due process argument. As we shall see, they did not get
very far.
B. First Amendment
Easterbrook quickly dismissed the Carsons' argument that the
FmHA had denied their request for deferral of payments in retalia-
tion for exercising the right to free speech. The plaintiffs had
"shouted down" the FmHA's public auction. Such activity was not
protected by the first amendment: "'Shouting down' an auction is
noise, not speech . . . . [It] is the antithesis of speech. The first
amendment does not protect loud noises that prevent others from
speaking or hearing."506
In his most important first amendment case, Judge Easterbrook
jumped over several procedural defenses 5 7 to void a statute outlawing
502. Id. at 587. Easterbrook also rejected a Pullman defense against a challenge to an anti-
pornography statute. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986).
503. Carson v. Block, 790 F.2d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 1986).
504. Id. at 565.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 566.
507. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct.
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"pornography" which the legislature defined as "sexually explicit sub-
ordination of women." This definition included depictions of the
"humiliation" and "domination" of women."' 8 Perhaps because he
felt awkward protecting lewd merchandise, Easterbrook wrote a
bewildering opinion. He first criticized the statutory language for
being so vague that it could authorize vast censorship: "It is unclear
how Indianapolis would treat works from James Joyce's Ulysses to
Homer's Iliad; both depict women as submissive objects for conquest
and domination."5 9 He then condemned the statute for being imper-
missibly content-based. Professor Catherine MacKinnon, a feminist
who believes that pornography is so hostile to women and so damag-
ing that it should be outlawed, drafted the statute. 1° Easterbrook
cited an article written by MacKinnon: "[I]f a woman is subjected,
why should it matter that the work has other value? ' 511 Professor
MacKinnon's writings thus proved the content-based assumptions of
the statute: "The state may not ordain preferred viewpoints in this
way. The Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective
right and silence opponents."' 1 2
Easterbrook then shifted gears by supporting MacKinnon's
proposition that pornography injures: "Depictions of subordination
tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status of women
in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at
home, battery and rape on the streets. '513 In addition, courts should
defer to legislative findings, even in sensitive first amendment cases:
"[A]s judges we must accept the legislative resolution of such dis-
puted empirical questions."5"4 Proof of some bad effects, however,
cannot alone justify the law: "Seditious libel is protected speech
1172 (1986). Easterbrook held that because the booksellers had been injured, they clearly had
standing and did not need to invoke the overbreadth doctrine. Id. at 327. He also held that
the case was ripe even though the statute had not yet taken effect because "[w]e gain nothing
by waiting." Id. The court did not need to abstain under the Pullman doctrine. Id.
508. Id. at 324. Easterbrook decided two other cases raising first amendment issues. He
did not have to resolve a first amendment claim a billboard company brought against
restrictive legislation because the case could be resolved on statutory grounds. National
Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d 571, 574 (7th Cir. 1986). His discussion
of a candidate's first amendment challenge to an election board's invalidation of signatures
needed to obtain a place on the ballot touched on whether to use the Pullman abstention
doctrine. See Citizens for John W. Moore v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 581 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
509. American Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 325.
510. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speed, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1985).
511. American Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 325 (citing MacKinnon, supra note 510, at 21).
512. Id. at 325.
513. Id. at 329.
514. Id. at 329 n.2.
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unless the danger is not only grave but also imminent."5'" Thus, it
did not matter if MacKinnon's perspective might be true: "A power
to limit speech on the ground that truth has not yet prevailed and is
not likely to prevail implies the power to declare truth."5'1 6
Easterbrook's opinion fails to answer at least one major question.
If a court is to defer to legislative findings of harm (and assumedly of
imminence of harm), and if the court even agrees that harm exists,
then why can't a city prohibit pornography if it is convinced that por-
nography is dangerous?
C. Due Process
1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Judge Easterbrook found that a plaintiff who had had his car
towed and could not get the car out of the impoundment lot after one
month had a procedural due process claim: "[The] city must establish
the process and tender an opportunity for a hearing; it may not sit
back and wait for the aggrieved person to file a suit." '5 17 In a decision
issued while sitting as a district court trial judge, Easterbrook held
that unemployment insurance claimants had no due process rights to
know about administrative rule changes as long as the rules were pub-
lished: "The plaintiffs may well be right that Illinois should imple-
ment this approach as a matter of wise administration, but the
Constitution does not require it."5 '' Once again we see Easterbrook
describe how courts cannot use the Constitution to implement justice
or efficiency. He seems unsympathetic to Professor Lon Fuller's argu-
ment that law has its own procedural morality, including public
notification.51 9
The plaintiffs who sued because the FmHA had not deferred
their mortgage payments also lost their due process argument.22
Easterbrook stated that because the general policy not to defer collec-
tion of payments was "legislative," not adjudicative, the plaintiffs had
no right to an individual hearing. 521 Nor did the government have
any due process duty to carry out the Act; otherwise, the due process
clause would incorporate all existing federal law.5 2 2 Finally, the
plaintiffs had not lost any "property" because the government had
515. Id. at 329.
516. Id. at 330.
517. Frier v. City of Vandalia, 770 F.2d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 1985).
518. Cosby v. Ward, 625 F. Supp. 619, 637 (N.D. I1. 1985).
519. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
520. Carson v. Block, 790 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1986).
521. Id. at 565.
522. Id.
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discretion in granting deferrals. Easterbrook cited another Seventh
Circuit opinion: "To the extent a request appeals to discretion rather
than to rules, there is no property. 5 23
2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
We have already seen how Easterbrook interpreted the govern-
mental immunity doctrine to deny damages to the estates of prison
guards who had been murdered during a prison riot.5 24 He adopted
Posner's "charter of negative liberties" conception of the Constitution
to limit the scope of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment: "There is no solution within the reach of a federal court, no
easy recourse in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The state has many choices, all costly, many bound to end in tragedy
for someone. It may make these tragic choices for itself. '52 5 This
flamboyant conclusion radically extended Parratt, which only immu-
nized tragic blunders. Easterbrook's invocation of Professor
Calabressi's notion of "tragic choices" was particularly inappropriate.
Choice implies intent, which even Easterbrook agrees is an element of
"deprivation under the fourteenth amendment." The immunization
of some choices-ordinary negligence, for example--does not require
the immunization of all choices-willful cruelty, for instance.
Judge Easterbrook even more clearly revealed his dislike of sub-
stantive due process in Gumz v. Morrissette, 26 writing a lengthy con-
currence to a decision in which the court held that the government
had not used "excessive force" when it arrested the plaintiff. 27 The
majority held that the government had not "shocked the conscience"
of the court because the plaintiff had not satisfied all three prongs of
the "shock the conscience" test: (1) serious injury, (2) disproportion-
ate force, and (3) malice.5 28 The state officials had not severely injured
the plaintiff even though the plaintiff may have proven that the state
had used disproportionate force and had acted maliciously. 29
Easterbrook replied that courts should only apply a "reasonable-
ness" test: if the arrest was "objectively reasonable" under the fourth
amendment, the court should end its inquiry. 30 Easterbrook provided
two examples of unreasonableness: "A claim that the police never
523. Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1986).
524. Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986).
525. Id. at 517.
526. 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644 (1986).
527. Id.
528. Id. at 1400.
529. Id. at 1401.
530. Id. at 1404.
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made a lawful arrest, or that after arrest the police skipped trial on the
way to the punishment, is within the central meaning of due pro-
cess."53' According to Easterbrook, the "reasonableness" test was
not as vague as the three pronged "shock the conscience" test,532 par-
tially because a court did not have to examine motive to determine
reasonableness. Motive inquiries frustrate attempts to create bright
lines in an area where the system needs rules, not vague standards or
balancing tests.133 Citing with approval Judge Bork's opinion in
Dronenburg v. Zech, 34 Easterbrook argued that lower courts should
not expand the "shock the conscience" doctrine unless under the
Supreme Court's explicit direction.535
Is Easterbrook's analysis inconsistent with some of his other
opinions? In Rowe, he limited constitutional tort liability to inten-
tional acts, 536 thereby making motive the central inquiry, but in this
case he decried the consideration of motive. He stated, in Citizens for
John W. Moore, 37 that the lower courts had a duty to expand
Supreme Court doctrine in its logical direction, but here he refused to
apply the "shock the conscience" test. Finally, in a dissent from an
opinion holding that prosecutors cannot comment on defendant's
silence in response to Miranda warnings, he argued that a court
should determine if any error was "harmless" by using a balancing
test, not bright lines: "I recognize that all of this has the makings of a
bad stew. A cup of analogy to the exclusionary rule, . . . a slice of
Stone v. Powell, a dollop of Wainwright v. Sykes, all seasoned by Don-
nelly. . . . Why scramble due process, preclusion of review, . . .
ineffective assistance of counsel, and other doctrines? Why not keep
things straight? ' 5 3' His answer to those rhetorical questions was that
simplistic "dichotomous answers" can be dangerous. Standards, not
formal rules, are better solutions.
Easterbrook's response to charges of inconsistency may be con-
tained in Gumz itself. He loathed substantive due process: "The use
of the Due Process Clauses to achieve substantive ends has no support
531. Id. at 1405.
532. Id. at 1406-07.
533. Id. at 1407.
534. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
535. Gumz, 772 F.2d at 1406. Apparently Easterbrook would not agree with Judge
Posner's natural law proposal to provide due process protection to "occupational liberty"
because that expansion would take place under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
536. See supra notes 487-93 and accompanying text.
537. Citizens for John W. Moore v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 581, 583 (7th Cir.
1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
538. United States ex rel. Miller v. Greer, 789 F.2d 438, 456 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
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in the language or history of the Constitution. The language speaks of
process, not substance. ' 539 Sounding somewhat like Attorney Gen-
eral Edwin Meese, Easterbrook noted that "rightly or wrongly" the
fourth amendment had been incorporated through the fourteenth
amendment to apply to the states. 54° He then reduced existing sub-
stantive due process cases to their facts. Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land concerned "the use of substantive due process to vindicate
'traditional family values.'""54  Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe only
protected "bodily integrity." 542 Nor can the plaintiff allege a depriva-
tion of "liberty" because citizens have no liberty interest to be free
from state action that "shocks."54 Easterbrook supported this star-
tling conclusion by stating that the Constitution does not provide as
much protection as tort law. The plaintiff may have a remedy in state
court for random deprivations, but can only win in federal court if he
or she can prove that state law authorized the challenged activity. 5"
Easterbrook's reservations about incorporation are disturbing.
Without incorporation, the Supreme Court erred in holding that the
District of Columbia violated due process by segregating schools.5 45
If the Court should not have incorporated the fourth amendment,
perhaps it also made a mistake in applying the first amendment to the
states. Attorney Floyd Abrams recently presented some potential
repercussions if the Court were to adopt the Meese/Easterbrook the-
ory opposing incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment via the due process clause: "[T]he Constitution [would
permit] New York to ban newspapers, California to establish a state
religion and Kansas to deny its citizens the right to assemble for the
purpose of protesting governmental misconduct." '546 This already
lengthy article is, however, not the place to wage that major war. I
primarily wanted to demonstrate how Easterbrook varies his analysis
depending upon the underlying substantive issues. In other words,
he has been as "result-oriented, " "unprincipled," and "nonneutral" as
the liberals he and his colleagues have so often criticized on those very
grounds. He is not thereby guilty of improper methodology; judges
should sometimes use balancing tests and at other times draw bright
539. Gumz, 772 F.2d at 1405.
540. Id. at 1406.
541. Id. at 1405.
542. Id. ("[T]he Court resurrected [substantive due process] to protect a new constellation
of values .... family, procreation, and privacy.").
543. Id. at 1408.
544. Id. at 1409.
545. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
546. Abrams, Mr. Meese Caricatures the Constitution, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1986, at A23,
col. 2.
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VII. WINTER
Judge Winter's opinions have been mercifully short; they are not
filled with elaborate constitutional theorizing. Although his opinions
on civil rights have been quite "conservative," he has been remarka-
bly sympathetic to criminal defendants. It is hard to imagine any of
the other four judges writing the following statement while ruling in
favor of a criminal defendant: "Whether because of the imperatives
of the adversary system or intuitive judgments about fairness, acts or
statements of parties, when offered by their adversaries, are not sub-
jected to tests uniformly imposed upon non-party witnesses. "548
A. Access to Courts
A group of social security recipients challenged termination of
their benefits by arguing that the government had not determined that
their condition had improved, although it was legally required to do
so. Even though they were receiving interim benefits, they sought
immediate relief in federal court while their claims were pending in
the administrative process. Winter held that they first had to exhaust
those administrative procedures: "We affirm on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because neither the named individuals nor the certified
class have had their benefits terminated and exhausted the available
review procedures. '549 Because they were receiving interim benefits,
the plaintiffs were not being irreparably injured.5 Nor could the
plaintiffs claim that the administrative proceedings were totally futile.
They could not claim jurisdiction under § 1343 because the Social
Security Act is not legislation that secures "equal rights."' 55' Finally,
requiring the plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies was
appropriate because the issue would be less abstract if presented to the
court after administrative proceedings and all parties would have a
better idea of what "improvement" meant. 552 Winter's analysis seems
reasonable, given the lack of immediate injury to the plaintiffs.
547. See, e.g., Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REv. 431 (1985).
548. Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 718 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
549. Smith v. Schweiker, 709 F.2d 777, 779 (2d Cir. 1983).
550. Id. at 781.
551. Id. at 780.
552. Id. at 780-81.
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B. First Amendment
A cable television company argued that it should be able to
broadcast the trial of General Westmoreland's libel suit against CBS.
The Second Circuit held that a television company had no right to
broadcast trials in federal court, even if all parties consented:
"[T]elevision coverage of federal trials is a right created by consent of
the judiciary, which has always had control over the courtrooms
",553
Winter, in a concurring opinion, explained why the parties' con-
sent was insufficient: "Even a request ... might put unfair pressure
on them lest opposition to television be revealed to the jury, which
might then draw an improper inference.""' 4 The courts need not
prove that injury will occur; they can implement time, place, and
manner per se exclusions because "the potentially undesirable effects
of television cannot be detected, or detected in a timely fashion ... on
a case-by-case basis ..... "'" This decision, like Judge Scalia's refusal
to grant reporters access to pretrial documents, is consistent with Pro-
fessor Dworkin's theory that the media has no unique right to access
to courts.-
5 6
Although he decided the case on statutory grounds, Winter
wrote an opinion in favor of union dissidents which reveals his sympa-
thy for values underlying the first amendment. He held that the
union cannot itself decide to suspend someone for disruption and
slander:
We believe that a union may not validly discipline a member
upon charges and a record which include accusations against union
officers as an essential element. To hold otherwise would seriously
undercut the protection offered by Salzhandler v. Caputo and sub-
stantially chill the exercise of union members' rights by increasing
the danger of subterfuge.5 57
C. Due Process
The proprietors of a nursing home, in Oberlander v. Perales,
argued that they had a due process right to a hearing before the state
could alter their Medicaid reimbursement rates. 5 8 Judge Winter used
553. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 24 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3478 (1985).
554. Id. at 26 (Winter, J., concurring).
555. Id.
556. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
557. Petramale v. Local No. 17 of Laborers Int'l Union, 736 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 593 (1985).
558. Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1984).
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a variety of arguments to repudiate the plaintiffs' theory. First, the
plaintiffs had no property interest in future reimbursements." 9 Sec-
ond, they had received adequate notice, had had a chance for an
administrative proceeding before any final set-off, and had the right to
state judicial review. 16  Winter then added a fourth prong, deference,
to the Mathews v. Eldridge5 6 1 three-prong balancing test, which
weighs (1) the plaintiff's interest, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
under existing procedures and probable value of additional safe-
guards, and (3) the interest of the government. "Mathews cautions
that 'substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of
the individuals charged ... with the administration of social welfare
programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consider-
ation of the entitlement claims of individuals.' "562
Winter also dismissed a doctor's due process attack on notice he
received questioning his Medicaid reimbursement requests: "The
Constitution does not require the detailed notice of a common law
pleading. '5 63 Sounding like Judge Easterbrook, Winter applied an
"objective" test to the administrative notice: "[A]ny reasonable per-
son in Dr. Rand's position would have instantly recognized that pend-
ing reimbursement claims might be affected .... Winter wittily
observed that the doctor, who may have admitted fraud, was really
upset about the underlying investigation: "[T]he prospect of testify-
ing in an administrative inquiry about some of the claims which he
now wraps in the Constitution must have seemed to Dr. Rand at the
time too much process rather than too little. 5165
Winter had little patience for a plaintiff who had previously filed
over 250 suits on his own behalf and had frequently made vicious,
anti-Semitic claims. The plaintiff failed on his due process claim
because he had had adequate notice, and thus no excuse for failing to
attend a hearing where the trial judge ruled against him.5 66 Winter
concluded that such a plaintiff could be enjoined from suing in fed-
559. Id. at 120. Winter noted that other plaintiffs would receive more protection because of
the nature of their interest: "Absent an emergency, a hearing is required prior to the final
destruction of tangible property." Id. at 122. He also explained why welfare recipients were
entitled to more relief: "In both Mathews and Goldberg the private parties faced complete
termination of the income stream at issue." Id. at 121.
560. Id.
561. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
562. Oberlander, 740 F.2d at 121 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
563. Rand v. Perales, 737 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1984).
564. Id.
565. Id. at 261.
566. In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1260 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 807
(1986).
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eral court because "[flederal courts have both the inherent power and
the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct
which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions. 5 67 The
court, therefore, could protect from additional litigation those who
had participated in prior cases against the plaintiff, whose tactics
"chill litigants from seeking relief to which they are entitled."5 68 Nev-
ertheless, the trial judge should not have enjoined the plaintiff from
using state courts, although the judge could require him to give those
courts notice of the federal injunction.5 69 Winter also provided the
plaintiff with a small loop-hole; the plaintiff could still use 28 U.S.C.
§ 372 to appeal complaints relating to judicial misconduct.570
D. Equal Protection
Like Judge Posner, Judge Winter has expressed judicial reserva-
tions about aggressive use of affirmative action. In EEOC v. Local
638,571 he dissented from an opinion which affirmed a trial court deci-
sion to hold a union in contempt for failing to comply with an affirma-
tive action plan. The union had not met a goal of twenty-nine percent
minority membership. Winter complained that "[t]his holding trans-
forms the 29% figure from a goal guiding the administrator's deci-
sions into an inflexible racial quota. 5 72 He added that the union's
behavior was not very contemptuous because an administrator had
been primarily responsible: certain classes of workers included many
minority members; the trial court misunderstood the statistics; and
"[t]he claim of under utilization was not even raised by the plaintiffs
in their motion for contempt. 5 73 Winter elaborated on the signifi-
cance of lack of demand for union workers: "[I]n light of the facts
that large numbers of journeymen did not work during the period in
question or worked only meager hours, reactive finger pointing at
Local 28 is a faintly camouflaged holding that journeymen should
have been replaced by minority apprentices on a strictly racial
basis." 57
4
Winter explained that the Supreme Court had found such quotas
were "of questionable constitutional validity" and were not appropri-
567. Id. at 1261.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 1263.
570. Id.
571. EEOC v. Local 638 . . .Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.
1985) (Winter, J., dissenting).
572. Id. at 1189.
573. Id. at 1191.
574. Id. at 1193.
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ate remedies under Title VII.575 Even if one disagrees with his deci-
sion, Winter's holding seemed consistent with existing Supreme Court
precedent, particularly Justice Powell's rejection of racial quotas in
Bakke.5 76 The Supreme Court, however, has recently decided that
the district court had acted within its remedial discretion in institut-
ing racial preferences to remedy past discrimination.177
In Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School v.
Ambach,57 s Winter faced the ticklish constitutional issue of setting
racial quotas to prevent whites from leaving schools that become
heavily populated with minorities. In his dissent from an opinion
holding that the case should be remanded to determine if such a quota
was needed, Winter complained that the School Board should prevail
because the plan was voluntary.5 79 He stated that the majority's deci-
sion to remand was based upon the false premise that any plan had to
be the best possible plan. In fact, the school board did not have to
offer the best plan because it had never acted unconstitutionally.1 0
The Board, because it had never acted illegally, did not have to meet
rigorous burdens of proof. The Board satisfied its burden of proof in
this case because it is so difficult to predict "tipping points."' 581 Fur-
thermore, reviewing such voluntary plans will deter other school
boards from initiating similar efforts to better integrate their schools.
The "tipping" issue is a fantastically complex problem, one that
cannot be adequately explored in a survey such as this. For instance,
the constitutionality of the "tipping" may vary depending upon the
institution; Professor Bell hypothesized that the Supreme Court might
defer to a law school faculty which limited the number of black law
professors after the faculty already had a greater percentage of black
academics than the percentage of blacks in the general population.8 2
Can or must blacks have it both ways: gaining access to positions
even if they are not the best qualified under existing criteria, but hav-
ing a right to such positions whenever they meet those criteria?
Even if one agrees that because of this country's history of slav-
ery and racism, blacks should have special access to skilled positions,
575. Id. at 1194 (citing Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984)).
576. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
577. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); see also Local
Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson
High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
578. 738 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1984).
579. Id. at 584 (Winter, J., dissenting).
580. Id.
581. Id.
582. Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39-57 (1985).
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one need not accept the same argument with respect to the racial mix
of schools. We cannot fully evaluate Winter's decision without deter-
mining whether the Constitution requires integration, quality educa-
tion, equal access, colorblindness, and/or quality integrated
education. Should courts ignore the predictable effects of battling
racism-white flight-particularly when an "innocent" school board
is voluntarily increasing integretion? We also have to reconsider the
"intent" element in the equal protection doctrine. What is the duty of
those who thereby cannot be proven to have acted illegally because of
the intent doctrine, but who may in fact have been participants in a
racist process? Winter may be correct to defer to a school board that
does not need to integrate further but has been willing to increase
integration so long as schools do not "tip." Regardless of whether he
is right or wrong, analysis of the problem is not simplified by the con-
servative platitude that the Constitution is "colorblind." ' 3 Winter
has to explain how he can oppose affirmative action on the grounds
that it is not colorblind,58 4 but support integration quotas, which also
are not colorblind. The question of race, thus, is not one of blindness,
but of vision.
E. Government Structure
Winter has not been extremely deferential to state power. He
dissented in Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Authority from a
decision, partially relying upon the twenty-first amendment, which
held that states can require that liquor prices be published, and that
the level of prices be maintained for thirty days.585 Winter began his
rebuttal by noting that such price maintenance would be illegal if
done by a private party.5 86 He found there was no "state action"
defense because the state did not actively supervise the lists.58 7 He
dismissed the constitutional argument on historical grounds: "Since
the twenty-first amendment was plainly designed only to allow the
583. This word is lifted from Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
584. As an academic, Winter attacked affirmative action: "[P]ursuit of equality in the
modem sense undermines social stability, threatens the democratic political process, and
imposes unacceptable economic costs." Winter, Changing Concepts of Equality. From
Equality Before the Law to the Welfare State, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 741, 741.
585. Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985).
586. Id. at 179 (Winter, J., dissenting). Winter cited Bork to help explain the scope of
antitrust law: "[T]o hold otherwise is to forbid states from authorizing resale price
maintenance, the anticompetitive effect of which is the subject of great controversy, but to
allow them to authorize horizontal price fixing, about which all agree." Id. at 179 (citing R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 289-91 (1978)).
587. Id. at 180.
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states to legislate against the evils of intoxicating liquors rather than
to reward its purveyors, I see no room for its application in the pres-
ent case." '
Winter did hold that a state can regulate out-of-state debt collec-
tors without violating the dormant commerce clause in Silver v.
Woolf 89 The collectors were not enforcing their own contracts; their
activity resembled unauthorized practice of law.590 The Supreme
Court has not created a per se rule against licensing of interstate busi-
ness; this regulation was a narrow standard under an already heavily
regulated business. 91 But most importantly, the state was operating
under authorization by federal law: "A state law which a federal
court might invalidate where Congress is silent will thus be upheld
where Congress has indicated its desire to allow the states to act."5 92
Winter dismissed as "totally speculative" the plaintiff's alternative
argument that the regulations violated the dormant commerce clause
by being too burdensome. 59
3
VIII. CONCLUSION
Many legal scholars have recently turned to literary theory and
literature for a richer understanding of the law. For instance, Profes-
sor Robin West argued that Judge Posner's glorification of choice
leads to the tragic universe portrayed by Franz Kafka in his novels
and short stories.5 94 Professor Ronald Dworkin has written that the
starting points of any legal opinion-constitutions, statutes, and/or
precedents-are "texts" that the judge must "interpret." A judge
therefore cannot and should not, be bound by the words of the text
and the author's intent; the judge must try to turn the text into the
best possible interpretation of the law. 95 Professor Clare Dalton has
"deconstructed" contract law.5 96
I have no quarrel with such enterprises-our legal system will
atrophy if it does not continually incorporate a fuller understanding
of the human condition. But such inquiries have the potential to
obscure a fundamental difference between law and art. In law, people
588. Id.
589. Silver v. Woolf, 694 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1982).
590. Id. at 12.
591. Id. at 11.
592. Id. at 13.
593. Id. at 14.
594. West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
595. R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986).
596. Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985).
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are hurt. We thus should devise different standards for legal deci-
sions than for aesthetic masterpieces. I find much to admire in Birth
of a Nation. Plessy v. Ferguson,5 97 however, is an unmitigated
disgrace.
. We also need to remember that law review articles fall some-
where between legal opinions and art. On one level, they are aes-
thetic, philosopical inquiries into the nature of the "good." But they
are far closer than art to the law and to the pain it distributes and
regulates. They usually advise the judges on how to decide specific
issues. Thus, I did not react severely when I finished my first article
comparing the academic writings of these five judges with the views of
Edmund Burke. Although I frequently disagreed with the five judges,
I admired their analytical and rhetorical skills. Sometimes they wrote
quite well, and occasionally they made me change my opinion or at
least lessened the intensity of my previously held beliefs. I also could
chuckle at trying to out-maneuver them by using one of their intellec-
tual leaders, Edmund Burke, as a foil. Obviously we were playing
with more than glass beads, but at least nobody was being immedi-
ately injured. Only a mood was being set.
Working through the opinions in this sequel has been another
story-a slow, depressing survey of the continued withering of the
Constitution. The conservatives are winning the constitutional debate
where it matters-in the regulation of the daily lives of the citizenry.
So why was the article entitled "Constraints of Power"? First of
all, to remind anxious liberals that these five men have not been alien
monsters, laying waste to all rights. None of them criticized Brown v.
Board of Education, 9s for instance. All of them have rejected some
state regulations of the content of speech. In short, we had better
hope that these judges, along with all the others, are somewhat con-
strained, internally and externally. Although they continue to use
many of the same analytical tools they applied while in the academy,
they have altered those views in the face of Supreme Court precedent.
We liberals should also take some comfort from the differences
among the five jurists. After all, these modem conservatives have not
resolved the proper relationship between freedom and authority any
more successfully than liberals. They are torn between moralism, free
marketeering, statism, positivism, libertarianism, and historicism.
Bork may be a positivist, but he provided some significant first
amendment protection. Posner expressed disturbing views about fam-
ilies, but offered a powerful foundation for procedural due process.
597. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
598. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Winter was willing to protect criminal defendants from excessive
prosecutorial discretion. Scalia at least joined Bork in requiring a
satirical poster to be displayed in a subway. Easterbrook struck down
an antipornography statute for being content-based.
The opinions are not uniformly hostile to contemporary liberal
values. At least as circuit court judges, the five jurists have usually
acted within existing precedent, although they have occasionally
expressed regrets. Many of their decisions were properly decided-
not every constitutional plaintiff should win. Sometimes they cre-
atively expanded or redefined rights.
The overall direction of these opinions, however, is clear: indi-
vidual constitutional rights are the exception, grudgingly given. After
all, these men believe that judicial review is presumptively illegiti-
mate. On a more political level, they have been powerful advocates
for the contemporary right-wing. As stated in the Introduction, Pres-
ident Reagan has to be pleased with the overall record of these five
men. One need only look at the recent appointment of Judge Scalia to
the Supreme Court of the United States.
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